Security computational

Computer Security Institute and Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2004. Ninth annual computer crime and security survey. San Francisco Computer Security Institute. 

Guynes S. EFTS impact on computer security. Computers Sec 2 (1) 73-77, 1983. 

National Computer Security Center. Glossary of Computer Security. U.S. Dept, of Defense, NCSC-TG-004-88, version 1, 1988. 

Smith MR. Commonsense Computer Security. London McGraw-Hill, 1989. 

NIST ITL Computer Security Resource Center http //csrc.nist.gov/... 

Availability emerges as a top-priority security requirement. A proper implementation has two parts a prompt deployment and a constant ability to sense the environment and forward traffic. In the traditional computer security, secrecy is associated with controlling who gets to read information. In the field of distributed sensor networks, the situation is different. The network itself may act as an intruder. In this case, the size of the nodes becomes an important design metric. Short range, multihop communication is also the prudent course of action. 

Meadows, Catherine, A Formal Framework and Evaluation Method for Network Denial of Service, 4—13, Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, Mordano, Italy, June 28-30,1999. New York IEEE Computer Society Press, 1999. 

McHugh J., Sets, Bags, and Rock and Roll Analyzing Large Data Sets of Network Data, in Proceedings of the 9th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security USENIX 04, Sept. 2004, Sophia-Antipolis, France. 

Bonatti, P. and P. Samarati, A unified framework for regulating access and information release on the web, Journal of Computer Security, 10(3) 241-272, 2002. 

Hosmer, H., Metapolicies ii, in Proc. of the 15th National Computer Security Conference, 1992. 

Landwehr, C., Formal models for computer security, Computing Surveys, 13(3) 247-278, September 1981. 

Jansen W.A., Determining Privileges of Mobile Agents, National Institute of Standards and Technology, in Proceedings of the Computer Security Applications Conference, December 2001... 

Failure to establish and implement computer security to assure data integrity in that during this inspection it was observed that an employee was found to have utilized... 

Failure to establish and implement adequate computer security to assure data integrity in that during this inspection it was observed that an employee was found to have utilized another person s computer access to enter data into the XXXX computerized record system. [21 CFR 211.68(b)] Review 21 CFR Part 11 for regulations pertaiiung to the... 

One difference between prime and composite numbers is that it takes relatively little time to determine if a number is prime, but far longer to determine the prime factors of a composite number, especially if the composite is very large (100 digits or more). This discrepancy in computation time is important in developing computer security systems. 

The restriction to computational security is not necessarily a serious objection to the use of asymmetric authentication, because, as mentioned, most symmetric schemes used in practice are not information-theoretically secure either, nor has their security been proved in any stricter sense. 

Probabilistic polynomial-time computations Computational security... 

Computational security. For computational security, the quantifier over the attacker strategies is restricted toAe PPA n Attacker class(Scheme, Req), where PPA denotes the class of probabilistic polynomial-time interactive algorithms. In this case, one can at most allow other system parameters to grow polynomially with the security parameters under consideration, and one usually requires superpolynomially small error probabilities only. 

Primarily, the two requirements on disputes are considered (and related additional requirements, such as fail-stop properties), and only information-theoretic and computational security are distinguished. Unforgeability, as mentioned, is a consequence of these two requirements. The other requirements are usually ftilfilled information-theoretically. 

The main variation is in the dependence on the recipients. Their role is similar to that of the risk bearers in fail-stop signature schemes To guarantee computational security for each recipient, even if many other participants are attacking, the entities of all recipients must take part in initialization. Hence initialization is much simpler if it is for a fixed recipient. 

Security parameters. As some requirements on a fail-stop signature scheme have to be fulfilled information-theoretically and others only computationally, it is natural to consider two security parameters. They are called a and k, where a measures the information-theoretic security and k the computational security. The primary role of cr is that the error probability in the fail-back requirement of the signer on disputes decreases exponentially with a. In other words, a determines the probability that the signer is cheated with unprovable forgeries. The primary role of k is to ensure the correctness of broken , i.e., the larger k is, the harder it should be to compute valid proofs of forgeries (and thus forgeries in the first place). 

One cannot simply use length as len, because length(k) > k (recall q> 2 ). Thus, given k, one must first compute a smaller k with length(k) < k. For efficiency in the subsequent construction of normal hash functions, it is even required that length(k) ki , but nevertheless, for computational security, make small(k ) should only be smaller than k by a polynomial factor. 

Is there necessarily a certain price in efficiency to pay for more security, and in particular, for information-theoretic security instead of computational security ... 

The second question is studied for the difference between signature schemes with ordinary, fail-stop, and information-theoretic security. Moreover, one can ask how much an increase in security within a given security type affects the attainable efficiency (see Figure 11.1). With a requirement that is fulfilled information-theoretically with an error probability, such an increase is expressed by the security parameter a that determines the bound on the error probability. Handling computational security is more complicated this is discussed in the introduction to Section 11.3. 

BuPf89 Holger Biirk, Andreas Pfitzmann Digital Payment Systems Enabling Security and Unobservability Computers Security 8/5 (1989) 399-416. 

Chen94 Lidong Chen Oblivious Signatures 3rd European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 94), LNCS 875, Springer-Verlag, Berlin 1994, 161-172. 

Diei91 Rudiger Dierstein The Concept of Secure Information Processing Systems and Their Basic Functions Computer Security and Information Integrity (IFIP/Sec 90), North-Holland, Amsterdam 1991,133-149. 

Gray92 James W. Gray III Toward a Mathematical Foundation for Information Flow Security Journal of Computer Security 1/3,4 (1992) 255-294. 

Pfit91a Birgit Pfitzmann Fail-stop Signatures Principles and Applications Compsec 91, 8th world conference on computer security, audit and control, Elsevier, Oxford 1991, 125-... 

WaPf90 Michael Waidner, Birgit Pfitzmann The Dining Cryptographers in the Disco Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability tvith Computationally Secure Serviceability Eurocrypt 89, LNCS 434, Springer-Verlag, Berlin 1990, 690. 

Computer security depends on limiting system breaches from the Internet. Commercial products are available to detect intrusion, i.e., unauthorized attempts to penetrate the system. These products alert IT personnel when an attack is detected. Commercial firewalls can minimize system penetration. Anti-virus programs can continually scan incoming material for vimses, worms, and trojans. None of these products can replace continual vigilance by IT personnel because a determined hacker can penetrate any commercial system and disrupt... 

Sebeiry, J., and Pieprzyk, J. Cryptography An Introduction to Computer Security. Ptentice Hall. Upper Saddle River. NJ, 1989. 

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