Chemical Weapons Convention verification regime

Graham H. Cooper, The Chemical Weapons Convention Verification Regime , UNIDIR Newsletter, No. 20 (December 1992), p. 11. 

At the conclusion of the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1992, this treaty was heralded as a major breakthrough in multilateral arms control. It was the first comprehensively verifiable multilateral treaty that completely banned an entire class of weapons, and went further than any previous treaty in the depth, extent and intrusiveness of its verification. Verification under the CWC includes compulsory national declarations about relevant industrial and military activities, destruction of chemical weapons within a time frame with intrusive verification, and a regime of routine inspections of declared industrial and military facilities. Additional features are the possibility of a challenge inspection, whereby a State Party can request an inspection of any site in another State Party at short notice, and provisions for the investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons. 

The First Review Conference noted that a large part of the OPCW s verification resources have in the past been spent on the verification of chemical weapons destruction operations. The planned increase in chemical weapons destruction in coming years and any resource constraints will require a thorough review of the current verification methodology used for chemical weapons destruction verification, as part of the effort to optimise the verification regime of the Convention. 

The position of the United States is somewhat uncertain. Successive administrations have sought a chemical weapons convention. The Reagan administration tabled extremely stringent provisions for verification in CD/500, including any time any place challenge inspection. At the time it can hardly have seemed likely that the Soviet Union would concede this point. Despite the fact that it has done so, doubts still exist in Western - and especially US - military circles about the effectiveness of the proposed verification regime. ... 

It is cmcial that the OPCW be able to adapt to the changing reahties so that the verification and implementation regimes of the Convention can continue to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons and the materials for making them, and in a manner that does not impede legitimate developments in the chemical industry. Non-State actors must not be allowed to gain access to toxic chemicals or to the means for producing them. 

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