Chemical Weapons Convention entry into force

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) opened for signature 13th January 1993. Entry into Force was after the ratification of 65 signatory states on 29th April 1997. To date there are 167 ratified States Parties and 20 Signatory States which are yet to ratify. There are 16 Non signatory States which have yet to accede to the convention. 

The entry into force of the 1993 CWC on 29 April 1997 was unique in the history of arms control. This agreement both banned an entire class of weapons and simultaneously addressed chemical proliferation concerns. It was not, however, the attention to non-proliferation that made the Convention unique, rather that the CWC incorporated an elaborate international system for verification of compliance.1... 

For example, the 1986 CWC Rolling Text stated The Consultative Committee shall. .. after the expiry of a period of... years from the date of entry into force of this Convention, undertake a review of the operation of this Convention in accordance with Article. .. , with the following footnote Some delegations were of the view that provisions on review should be more appropriately included in another part of the Convention. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament, CD/727, 21 August 1986, pp. 45-46. 

Statement by the Russian Federation at the First Session of the Conference to Review the Functioning of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The 1 per cent destruction represents the target for the first intermediate destruction deadline, which, according to Part IV(A) of the CWC s Verification Annex, should have been met three years after entry into force. Russia was granted an extension to this deadline by the Executive Council in 2000. 

The provisions of the CWC itself, as with other aspects of the OPCW s work and mandate, provide the framework within which any elaboration of its universality must proceed. Although the word universality does not appear explicitly in the text, the first, sixth and final preambles to the CWC nevertheless make reference to progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control , to exclude completely the possibihty of the use of chemical weapons , and the complete and effective prohibition of. .. chemical weapons . Clearly, none of these aims can be fuUy realized without adherence by all states and fulfilment of the requirements to implement the CWC in and across all jurisdictions. This has been consistently recognized in decisions of successive sessions of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC and through the development of a plan of action, which is inspired by the objective of achieving universal adherence to the Convention ten years after its entry into force (i.e. by 2007). 

Iran/Iraq war of the 1980s led to the negotiations being completed with the opening for signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention in January 1993 and its entry into force on 29 April 1997. 

Chemical weapons must be destroyed within 10 years of the EIF of the Convention, i.e. by 29 April 2007, and the destruction process is to begin within two years of the Convention entering into force. Destruction or conversion activities at CWPFs must begin within one year of the Convention s entry into force, and equally be completed within 10 years. However, a state party may request an extension of up to five years, i.e. until 2012, of the deadline for the destruction of its CW stockpiles. 

Monitoring implementation of the convention will be an international agency, the Hague-based Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. A predecessor organization, the Preparatory Commission, is working to facilitate the entry into force of the convention and to establish the permanent agency. 

Goldblat 1994, p. 227. The establishment of the IAEA predates and is separate from the entry into force of the NPT, with respect to which it has been tasked with supervisory responsibUi-ties. Compare this to the Orgtmization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons specifically established under the Chemical Weapons Convention to achieve the object and purpose of this Convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties (Article Vll, para 1). 

The United States has signed two agreements that will allow for further chemical weapons inspections within the U.S. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was signed in January 1993 and awaits ratification by 65 nations before implementation. The United States h not yet ratified that treaty. The Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA) was supposed to go into effect between the United States and the Russian Republic (The Soviet Union was in existence when the BDA was signed). That agreement has not been implemented and may not be implemented rmtil the CWC reaches entry into force. 

Each State Party shall destroy all chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 pursuant to the Verification Annex and in accordance with the agreed rate and sequence of destruction (hereinafter referred to as order of destruction ). Such destruction shall begin not later than two years after this Convention enters into force for it and shall finish not later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention. A State Party is not precluded from destroying such chemical weapons at a faster rate. 

Chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 may be temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons in accordance with Part V, paragraphs 18 to 25, of the Verification Annex. Such a converted facility must be destroyed as soon as it is no longer in use for destruction of chemical weapons but, in any case, not later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention. 

The Technical Secretariat shall establish, not later than 180 days after entry into force of this Convention and maintain, for the use of any requesting State Party, a data bank containing freely available information concerning various means of protection against chemical weapons as well as such information as may be provided by States Parties. 

If a State Party, due to exceptional circumstances beyond its control, believes that it cannot achieve the level of destraction specified for Phase 1, Phase 2 or Phase 3 of the order of destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons, it may propose changes in those levels. Such a proposal must be made not later than 120 days after the entry into force of this Convention and shall contain a detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposal. 

If an extension is granted, the State Party shall still be under the obligation to meet the cumulative destruction requirements set forth for the next destruction deadline. Extensions granted pursuant to this Section shall not, in any way, modify the obligation of the State Party to destroy all Category 1 chemical weapons not later than 10 years after the entry into force of this Convention. 

A decision on the request shall be taken by the Conference at its next session, on the recommendation of the Executive Council. Any extension shall be the rrrinimum necessary, but in no case shall the deadline for a State Party to complete its destruction of all chemical weapons be extended beyond 15 years after the entry into force of this Convention. The Executive Council shall set conditions for the granting of the extension, including the specific verification measures deemed necessary as well as specific actions to be taken by the State Party to overcome problems in its destruction programme. Costs of verification during the extension period shall be allocated in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 16. 

The provisions of paragraphs 53 to 61 shall apply to chemical weapons destruction operations that are to begin not earlier than 390 days after the entry into force of this Convention. 

Chemical weapons production facdities converted into chemical weapons destruction facilities before entry into force of this Convention shall be declared imder the category of chemical weapons production facilities. 

They shall be subject to an initial visit by inspectors, who shall confirm the correctness of the information about these facdities. Verification that the conversion of these facilities was performed in such a manner as to render them inoperable as chemical weapons production facilities shall also be required, and shall fall within the framework of measures provided for the facilities that are to be rendered inoperable not later than 90 days after entry into force of this Convention. 

Conversion of a chemical weapons production facility shall be completed not later than six years after entry into force of this Convention. 

Also noting that States Parties have requested the extension of the deadline to complete the destruction of all their chemical weapons up to 15 years after entry into force of the Convention (29 April 2012) and the need to consider the progress and efforts to achieve complete destruction in accordance with the provisions of the Convention ... 

Recalling further that, according to Part IV (A), paragraph 24, of the Verification Annex, if a State Party believes that it will be unable to ensure the destruction of all of its Category 1 chemical weapons not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the Convention, it may submit a request to the Executive Council (hereinafter the Council ) for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such chemical weapons, and that, according to paragraph 26 of that Part, a decision on the request shall be taken by the Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter the Conference ) at its next session, on the recommendation of the Council ... 

Bearing in mind the stipulations in the same paragraph that any extension shall be the minimum necessary, and that in no case shall the deadline for a State Party to complete the destruction of its chemical weapons be extended beyond 15 years after the entry into force of the Convention, in other words, 29 April 2012 ... 

Welcoming the commitment of the Russian Federation to the task of destroying its Category 1 chemical weapons as soon as possible but in no case later than 15 years after the entry into force of the Convention, and the efforts it has already made to achieve that goal and... 

The Second Review Conference noted that the Secretariat and the States Parties have acquired considerable experience with the conduct of more than 3000 inspections at over 1080 chemical weapons-related and industrial sites in 80 States Parties since the entry into force of the Convention. The Second Review Conference noted with satisfaction that no case of non-compliance had been brought to the attention of the Council. 

---