Three Es of safety

The Three Es of Safety Another concept for accident prevention builds on the Three Es of Safety. The three Es are engineering, education, and enforcement. This approach links to the idea presented earlier that unsafe acts and unsafe conditions result in accidents. Figure 3-4 shows how the three Es links to that idea. Engineering primarily seeks to prevent unsafe conditions. Engineering can also deal with unsafe acts. Later chapters will cover ergonomics and human behavior as part of safety engineering. 

Figure 3-4. A traditional approach for safety improvement that applies the Three Es of Safety.

The Three Es of Safety concept in Chapter 3 suggests some approaches for preventing unsafe acts. Education, enforcement, and engineering all have a role. Enthusiasm, a fourth E, has a role, too. Also, there are other concepts that apply. Chapters 32 addresses procedures, rules, and training. Chapter 36 discusses safety management systems. 

However, an approach that conld affect behavior modification was not well understood at the time. Today, the three Es of safety have been modified to inclnde attention to social issnes snch as ... 

In the first concept, William Heinrich argues that accidents are caused by unsafe acts and conditions. He and others differ significantly with regard to the relative importance of unsafe acts and unsafe conditions or their combinations. The other concept covers the three Es of safety Engineering, Education, and Enforcement. 

In the area of prevention, there are still the three Es of safety ... 

This chapter outlines ten new perspectives we need to adopt in order to exceed current levels cf safety excellence and reach our ultimate goal—a Total Safety Culture. The traditional three Es of safety management—engineering, education, and enforcement—have only gotten us so far. A Total Safety Culture requires understanding and applying three additional Es—empowerment, ergonomics, and evaluation. 

Some operational definitions of the traditional three Es for safety (especially enforcement) have been detrimental to employee empowerment. Many supervisors have translated "enforcement" into a strict punishment approach, and the result has turned off many employees to safety programs. These workers may do what is required, but no more. Some individuals who feel especially controlled by safety regulations might try to beat the system, and success will likely bring a sense of gratification or freedom. This is predictable from theory and research in the area of psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966,1972) and is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 

The BDMP supporting a risk analysis of this system is given in Fig. 5. It models the different scenarios that lead to pollution of the environment (the top event). There are three t3q>es of possible scenarios attack scenarios, accidental scenarios or hybrid scenarios. The first type of scenarios is a successful attack initiated by a malicious person, the second type is based on mere accidental events like failures of the system s components and the third type is a combination of attacks and components failures. This latter type best characterizes the possible interactions between safety and security events. 

Heinrich s work was the forerunner of the widely held philosophy that proactive safety was centered in the three Es — engineering, education, and enforcemenf —a viewpoint that has lasted nearly four decades. The idea that 85% of accidents were caused by imsafe acts and only 15% by hazardous conditions resulted in nearly universal adherence in safety management circles and the emphasis appeared appropriate (Petersen 1989). This observation was subsequently vahdated by other organizations, although with different numerical ratios (e.g., DuPont). 

The. Order contains three lists of standards. Attachment 1 addresses those standards that are mandatory as a result of non-DOE Federal or state ES H statutes and/or implementing requirements. Under the topic of Radiation Protection, no standards are listed. Under the topic of Radioactive Material Packaging and Transportation Safety, two standards (References 45 and 46) from... 

The HCF maintenance management program is described in the SNL/NM Nuclear Facility Maintenance Implementation Plan (MIP) in (SNL 1997) and the SNL/NM Site Maintenance Plan (SNL 1993). Maintenance activities for the HCF are conducted by the three groups mentioned above that is, HCF personnel, ES H Center personnel, and FOE Center personnel. The scope of SSCs for which maintenance will be performed is established by the latest edition of the HCF Master Equipment List (MEL). This list differentiates between safety-related and nonsafety-related SSCs and specifically identifies those SSCs for which TSR surveillance requirements have been established, it also identifies the organization responsible for performing maintenance on each item. 

The FMCSA only requires one road test — at the time of hire. Many carriers exceed this requirement. The following road test best practice illustrates three test t3q>es that a carrier could implement into its safety program. 

The shift in how paradigm is commonly defined does contain an important lesson. When we adopt and use new definitions, our mindset or perception changes. In other words, as I indicated in the previous chapter, we act ourselves into a new way of thinking or perceiving. This is a primary theme of this book. When employees get involved in more effective procedures to control safety, they develop a more constructive and optimistic attitude toward safety and the achievement of a Total Safety Culture. Let us consider the shifts in principles, procedures, beliefs, attitudes, or perceptions needed for the three new Es—ergonomics, empowerment, and evaluation—and for achieving a Total Safety Culture. 

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