Thing-in-itself

If the purpose of a calculation is to probe the inherent properties of a molecule as a thing in itself, or of a phenomenon centered on isolated molecules, then we do not want the complication of solvent. For example, a theoretically oriented study of the geometry and electronic structure of a novel hydrocarbon, e.g. pyramidane [6], or of the relative importance of diatropic and paratropic ring currents [7], properly examines unencumbered molecules. On the other hand, if we wish, say, to calculate from first principles the pZa of acids in water, we must calculate the relevant free energies in water [8]. Noteworthy too is the fact that solvation, in contrast to gas phase treatments, is somewhat akin to molecules in bulk, in crystals [9]. Here a molecule is solvated by its neighbors in a lattice, although the participants have a much more limited range of motion than in solution. Rates, equilibria, and molecular conformations are all affected by solvation. Bachrach has written a concise review of the computation of solvent effects with numerous apposite references [10]. 

To recapitulate, the organization picture leads to a dilemma. What our conceptual schemes organize either has inherent structure, or has no inherent structure. The first hom - organizational metaphysical realism - provides external constraints but sacrifices internal realism. The second hom - blob realism - saves us from metaphysical realism, but has no defense against relativism. Perhaps, however, there is a way to break out of the dilemma to treat what we organize as something like the Kantian thing in itself. 

The second function of the thing in itself is to explain the facticity of knowledge in the sense that the objects of knowledge are not simply our creations. There is a... 

Attempts to describe the structure and to define exhaustively the name of a system as a thing in itself au-e usually fruitless, and discussions of jellies have shown this once again. 

They all work together, while each relationship is a discrete thing in itself. 

The second type of possibility b), which is associated with form, is the possibihty of the thing in itself fi nafoi-hi, fi dhdti-hi). This I shall term per se possibihty , or essential possibihty . If I say, for instance, that the autumnal colour I am calling yellowish brown is possible in itself, I will be referring to the possibihty of existence of the colour itself, rather than to the susceptibihty of some substrate or other to receive this coloiu. And, I propose that, for Avicenna, per se possibihty can be either absolute and xmiversal, or conditional and particular, and that in this context his expression possible in itself should be read as referring to particular perse possibihty, as I shah explain shortly. 

Al-Mas udi further disputes Avicenna s claim, in the context of Ishdrdt II.5.6, that if [a thing] is not possible of existence before it comes to be, it will be impossible of existence . But on what basis do you assert this (wa-lima qultum dhdlika) , he challenges in typical kaldm manner, before accusing Avicenna of confusing two senses of possibility dispositional possibility and perse possibility (that is, the possibility of the thing in itself , ft najsi-hi, as Avicenna writes). 

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