Subject nuclear fuel reprocessing

The possible application of aqueous plutonium photochemistry to nuclear fuel reprocessing probably has been the best-received justification for investigating this subject. The necessary controls of and changes in Pu oxidation states could possibly be improved by plutonium photochemical reactions that were comparable to the uranyl photochemistry. 

In a test at Mayak nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Russia, alkaline high-active waste was subjected to extraction by a mixture of parent /-butyl calix[6]arene, 2- [bis(2-hydroxyethyl)amino]methyl -4-alkylphenol, and a solubilizer in dodecane. 

The mutual separation of actinide elements and the selective isolation of useful actinides from fission products are indispensable for the nuclear fuel cycle and have become important subjects of investigation for the development of advanced nuclear fuel reprocessing and TRU (TRans Uranium elements) waste management [1], A variety of research concerning the separation chemistry of actinides has so far been accumulated [2]. There are, however, only a few theoretical studies on actinides in solution[3-5]. Schreckenbach et a), discussed the stability of uranyl (VI) tetrahydroxide [UO,(OH) ] [3] and Spencer and co-workers calculated the optimized structures of some uranyl and plutonyl hydrates [AcO, nH,0 (Ac = U, Pu and n = 4,5,6)] [4],... 

Since that time, laser photochemistry has become a popular subject and with it have come the laser photochemists looking for a photon target. Obviously, the first laser photons would be aimed toward isotope separations which required the narrow band-widths which the laser so uniquely provided but spin-off targets have since included the separations of reactor fuel components in reprocessing and/or waste isolation systems. Although much has been promised from the application of lasers to the reprocessing of nuclear fuels, there has been very little evidence that would... 

Aqueous reprocessing methods have been developed to effect an efficient and thorough separation of fissile elements from the contaminating fission products in spent fuel( l). While these processes may be altered to yield a proliferations-resistant product by coprocessing or by the addition of radioactive material that will contaminate the clean fissile material, it still is necessary to safeguard some of the process steps to ensure that material useful in nuclear weapons will not be diverted (3). The safeguard requirements and the ease of subversion of such provisions make many versions of the conventional processes subject to unacceptable proliferation risks. 

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