Threat analysis, security issues

The risk being analyzed in a TSVA is an expression of the likehhood that a defined threat will exploit a specific vulnerabihty of a particnlar target or combination of targets to cause a given set of consequences along a transportation route. Since historical data and trends (available for accidents) do not directly apply to intentional acts, a secnrity risk analysis is usually performed using qualitative techniques. The expected outcome is a qualitative estimate of risk that can be used as a basis for determining which security issues may require additional protective countermeasures. 

The newly revised Chapter 13 addresses security issues in emergency departments, pediatric locations, infant care units, medication storage locations, cUnical labs, forensic patient treatments areas, and behavioral units. The chapter also addresses communications, data infrastructure, and security of medical/health records. Chapter 13 covers media relations, crowd control, employee practices, and security operations. Facilities must conduct a security vulnerability analysis and planning for the protection of people and resources beyond a disaster event. Security education should address customer relations, emergency procedures, use of force issues, importance of effective de-escalation of tense tactics, and restraint usage. The new code reqnires the development of policies, plans, and procedures to address hostage situations, bomb threats, workplace violence, disorderly conduct, and restraining order policies. 

In April 2007, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standard (CFATS). The DHS is to identify, assess, and ensnre effective security at high-risk chemical facilities. Included in this standard is the requirement for facilities handling chemicals above a threshold amount, to submit an SVA for DHS review and approval along with a Site Security Plan (SSP). An SVA evaluates risk from deliberate acts that could result in major incidents. It is performed in a systematic and methodical manner to analyze potential threats and evaluates these threats against plant vulnerabilities. From this analysis, it determines possible consequences and whether safeguards to prevent or mitigate their occurrence are recommended. See also Terrorism. 

However, generally speaking cost-benefit analysis used in law enforcement and crime prevention policies is still rather simple and usually takes only some of the outcomes into account (European Commission, 2004). Moreover, after the terrorist attack of 9/11 there has been much focus on preventing or mitigating damage and causalities caused by terrorist activities. A key issue is whether the investment in counter-terrorism devices is well spent in a manner that optimizes public safety in a cost-effective manner. However, to compare costs and benefits requires the quantification of threat probability. Threat prob-abflity is the likelihood that a threat will occur. The formulas mentioned above do not include the issue of risk assessment or address the quantification of security risks (e.g., Stewart et al. 2006 Stewart and Netherton 2008 Dillon et al. 2009 Cox 2009). This is a challenging task, but necessary for probabilistic terrorism risk assessment. In next section, we will discuss the detail formulation of the net benefit of a security measure. 

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