SCUD missiles

Why have there been no terrorist attacks with nerve agents in the many months since 9-11 The answer seems obvious chemical weapons are not particularly effective At best, they cause deaths in a circumscribed area where there is no protection and no escape. Two hundred kilograms of conventional high explosive, (the capacity of a SCUD missile) can cause more deaths than the same amount of "nerve gas." Any statement that such agents will cause tens of thousand of casualties is gross hyperbole. What is worse, it unnecessarily fans the flames of panic. 

A considerable part of this book was written while the authors were living in Riyadh during the Gulf War. With Scud missiles and the threat of chemical warfare, we can only hope that we will see more use of chemical reactions for the production of useful petrochemical products rather than missiles and chemical weapons. 

The dynamics of a Patriot missile launcher located somevdiere in Saudi Arabia to shoot down incoming SCUD missiles are given by the following openloop transfer function between 6 (the angle between the horizon and the missile direction) and M (the power to the motor that positions the launcher) ... 

From 18 January to 28 February 1991, 39 Iraqi-modified SCUD missiles reached Israel.4 Although many were off target or malfunctioned, some of them landed in and around Tel Aviv. Approximately 1,000 people were treated as a result of missile attacks, but only 2 died. Anxiety was listed as the reason for admitting 544 patients and atropine overdose for hospitalization of 230 patients. Clearly, these conventionally armed SCUDs were not effective mass casualty weapons, yet they caused significant disruption to the population of Tel Aviv. Approximately 75% of the casualties resulted from inappropriate actions or reactions on the part of the victims. Had one of the warheads contained a chemical or biological agent that killed or intoxicated a few people, the terror effect would have been even greater. 

The actual attack on Iraq on 16 January 1991 as part of the United Nations s mandated effort to free Kuwait, designated Operation Desert Storm by the United States, escalated fears of a new chemical war to levels not seen since World War I. The initial air attack concentrated on Iraqi chemical-production facilities, bunkers, and lines of supply. While the air attacks were ongoing, daily news accounts addressed the potential for chemical and biological warfare. On 28 January, Saddam Hussein told Peter Arnett of CNN News that his Scud missiles, which were already hitting Israel and Saudi Arabia, could be armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear munitions.230 Vice President Dan Quayle, while visiting the United Kingdom, was reported... 

Militarily significant weapons need not be MCBWs. Thirty-nine Iraqi-modified Scud missiles reached Israel from 18 January through 28 Febru-... 

Julian Perry Robinson, Seth Cams and Professor Matthew Meselson were equally reassuring. Perry Robinson asserted that elements of the media and the Pentagon had overestimated the significance of Iraq s chemical stockpile. He maintained that its primary value was psychological, that the casualty effects of nerve gas would be blunted by its volatility in hot desert conditions, and that the Iraqi stockpile was far too small to be employed effectively over the potential size of battlefield. He also suspected that Iraq s air power - the most potent means of delivery -would not last long in a battle with coalition air forces, and that the SCUD missiles would prove too inaccurate to attack air bases systematically. Meselson affirmed that the Iraqi chemical attacks were never any more than marginally effective against forces with anti-chemical protective... 

Suppressing NATO s nuclear capabilities which are widely dispersed over Western Europe in air bases and supply depots is another major Soviet priority. Should nuclear weapons be withheld, persistent chemical agents, such as thickened soman, delivered by SCUD missiles, could be extremely effective. After a few repeated strikes, these bases could be rendered inoperative for an extended period of time or reduced in readiness as time was consumed in elaborate decontamination. Chemical weapons could also be employed in fulfilling another basic principle of Soviet operations, namely attacks upon the enemy throughout the entire depth of this deployment . Die targets would include air bases, command, control and communication facilities, harbours, airports and other transportation centres. 

Had Iraq used chemicals in its SCUD missile launchers or used artillery-based chemical munitions against US and coalition forces, it is very likely that a devastating response from conventional explosives (or even nuclear warheads) would have been the result. It is then quite likely that few of Iraq s Republican Guard assets would have survived the war. Perhaps because of this threat of coalition response, Saddam Hussein finally elected not to use CW. 

Patriot Missile failed to track and intercept a Scud missile attack in Saudi Arabia and hit army barracks killing 28 due to a software bug. 

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