Schedule 3 chemicals research purposes

GHB has been used both for legitimate clinical and chnical research purposes and for a range of iUicit purposes. It was marketed legally in the United States until 1990, when the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) banned its sale to consumers. Except for the one indication described later in this section, GHB is a Schedule I controlled substance without other FDA-approved indications. The FDA has also declared y-butyrolactone (GBL) as a List I chemical and 1,4-butanediol (1,4-BD) as a Class I health hazard, practically designating these GHB precursors, which are also industrial solvents, as illicit and unapproved new drugs (National Institute on Drug Abuse 2000). 

The foundation of the CWC s inspection activities was based around the declaration by member states of their chemical weapons capabilities and activities. Nations with chemical warfare programmes were required to declare their production, storage and destruction facilities, which would then receive top monitoring priority. Nevertheless, the CWC did allow states to maintain research programmes to ensure the integrity of defensive equipment such as gas masks and gas detectors, but these activities were also to be closely monitored since they involved work with the chemical agents listed on Schedule l.9 Otherwise, all other warfare agents, mustard gas, Lewisite, soman, sarin, tabun, VX and the capability to produce them were to be eliminated under the watchful eyes of international inspectors (Table 8.1).10 The convention thus defined chemical weapons as any toxic chemical, or its precursors, intended for purposes other than those not prohibited under this convention for... 

The provisions relating to Schedule 1 chemicals reflect the complexity of the CWC s requirements in this regard. Basically, a permit is required by the operator of a facility if Schedule 1 chemicals. .. are likely to be produced, acquired, retained or used at, or transferred from, the facility during the year . There is an exception for facilities that meet the following conditions (a) the total amount of chemicals hkely to be acquired, retained or used at, or transferred from, the facility during the year does not exceed 100 grams (b) there is no production of Schedule 1 chemicals at the facility during the year and (c) the Schedule 1 chemicals are intended to be put only to research, medical or pharmaceutical purposes. 

Within the confines of the CW prohibition regime, that is among states parties to the CWC, transfers of toxic chemicals have to be declared in relation to Schedule 1 chemicals only. According to Part VI such transfers are permissible only for research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes. Individual transfers have to be notified to the OPCW Technical Secretariat 30 days before they are scheduled to take place by both sender and recipient. In addition, [e]ach State Party shall make a detailed annual declaration regarding transfers during the previous year. ... 

The verification provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention are not nearly as extensive as those employed by UNSCOM. The CWC inspectors will lack the access rights, the freedom of movement, and the surveillance opportunities enjoyed by UNSCOM. They will have to implement two systems of verification, involving routine and challenge inspections. Under the routine system, inspectors will be required to validate the declarations of participating states to the OPCW on topics specified in the treaty. This will include initial information on the size and composition of existing stockpiles, storage facilities, and any production facilities the actual destruction of those stockpiles and production facilities (or the conversion of the latter for purposes not prohibited under the Convention) the non-diversion of chemicals made in civilian facilities for military purposes and the operation of the single, small-scale facility pennitted to each state party for the production of Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical, protective and other purposes. 

The national aggregate of all Schedule 1 chemicals within a State Party may not exceed 1 ton at any given time. Production data must be declared for the following the single small-scale facility (SSSF) with a maximum annual production of up to 1 ton per year per State Party for protective purpose facilities with aggregate production of up to 10 kg per year per State Party and for research, medical, and pharmaceutical facilities with an aggregate... 

The chemical weapons production facility shall be converted in such a manner that the converted facility is not more capable of being reconverted into a chemical weapons production facility than any other facility used for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes not involving chemicals listed in Schedule 1. 

A State Party shall not produce, acquire, retain, transfer or use Schedule 1 chemicals unless (a) The chemicals are applied to research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes and... 

A State Party may transfer Schedule 1 chemicals outside its territory only to another State Party and only for research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes in accordance with paragraph 2. 

Each State Party that produces Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes shall carry out the production at a single small-scale facility approved by the State Party, except as set forth in paragraphs 10,11 and 12. 

Production of Schedule 1 chemicals in quantities of more than 100 g per year may be carried out for research, medical or pharmaceutical purposes outside a single small-scale facility in aggregate quantities not exceeding 10 kg per year per facility. These facilities shall be approved by the State Party. 

The need to produce a chemical listed in Schedule 1 can only be justified by its use for any of the following purposes research, medical, pharmaceutical, or protective. This criterion is further linked to another restriction, which requires that the type and quantities are appropriate for the declared purpose. 

Recognising further that the production limits specified in Part VI of the Verification Annex, when applied to Schedule 1 chemicals that are produced and consumed without being isolated, might in the future have a negative impact on production of such chemicals for research, medical, pharmaceutical, or protective purposes by limiting the quantities that can be produced and held for purposes not prohibited under the Convention ... 

The acquisition, retention, in-country-transfer, import, export and the use of Schedule 1 chemicals are prohibited unless the chemicals are exclusively applied to research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes and the types and quantities of chemicals are strictly limited to those which can be justified for such purposes. These activities are subject to prior declaration in accordance with regulations established under this [Act, Statute, Ordinance, etc.]. ... 

States parties may consider granting such exemption to laboratories producing by synthesis Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical or pharmaceutical purposes in aggregate quantities less than 100 g per year per facility in accordance with paragraph 12 of Part VI of the Verification Atmex. 

The Second Review Conference recognised the decrease in the number of remaining Chemical Weapons storage facilities but reiterated the conclusion of the First Review Conference on the importance of possessor States Parties implementing appropriate measures to secure such storage facilities and to prevent movement of their chemical weapons out of the facilities, with the exception of removal for destruction or (in accordance with the provisions of the Convention) withdrawal of Schedule I chemicals for use for research, medical, pharmaceutical, or protective purposes. 

OFRMPhP other Schedule 1 facilities for research, medical, or pharmaceutical purposes OCPF other chemical production facilities... 

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