Safety violations under-reporting

The experiences of the airline industry with maintenance violations and falsification of records after deregulation, and the widespread concerns about under-reporting of safety problems identified in the rail industry interviews, raise another note of caution here. In particular, there is some indication that financial and union difficulties in the airline industry exacerbated the incentives for some airlines to cut comers on maintenance (Transportation Research Board, 1991, pg. 184). To the extent that deregulation causes similar stresses within the nuclear power industry, some companies may face similar incentives to ignore or under-report safety problems, and/or avoid regulatory sanctions by evasion rather than by enhanced maintenance efforts. This is consistent with the prediction that less effort may be devoted to issues that are perceived as gray areas, but can have unforeseen safety consequences. 

Another concern is the potential of deregulation to create challenges to the maintenance of an effective corporate safety culture. In the aviation and rail industries, corporate culture problems affected safety in the aftermath of mergers and acquisitions, and also at some of the new entrant airlines established after deregulation. In the years after deregulation, there were also indications of pressure to under-report some types of safety problems in the railroad industry, and evidence of maintenance violations at several major airlines. In the U.K. nuclear power industry, corporate culture concerns dealt with the excessive use of contractors and the loss of corporate expertise and institutional memory. 

Positive dilute. If the test is a positive dilute, it is treated as a positive test result — end of story. The driver is removed from a safety-sensitive function, is given a list of Substance Abuse Professionals (SAPs), and must rmdergo the DOT Return-to-Duty Process in order to operate a commercial motor vehicle (CMV) again. The violation is reported to futm e DOT-regulated employers under the Safety Performance History inquiry in 391.23 or the DOT drug and alcohol investigation... 

These controls are then discussed in the appropriate chapter of the DSA and carried forth to the TSRs. The TSRs form the equivalent of an operating license. Violations of these nuclear safety requirements are reportable under the PAAA and may subject the contractor to fines. 

What do these ideas have to do with science The answer is that science as an undertaking is a quite human process that relies on many decisions. For example, progress in science relies on the complete honesty of those who report their experimental results, because (among other reasons) those results are key to the understanding of the natural phenomena under investigation. In addition, because scientific results are generally made public and accessible to all, it is extremely important that scientific results are trustworthy. If results are not reported honestly, then anyone who uses these results in his or her work has had his or her trust violated, and the injured party has wasted time and other resources. When the results impact a field such as medicine, or bear on product safety, an immense number of people could be put in harm s way because of decisions made on the basis of false information. 

Based on the data provided by such reports, Gosatomnadzor considers sufficiency of safety justifications during defueling of FSV LepsE" storages to exclude violations of nuclear and radiation safety requirements and overexposure of the FSV s personnel, population and environment under both normal and off-normal operating conditions. 

If a driver receives a ticket or citation for any moving traffic violation, that event must be reported to the driver s supervisor or to the Safety Department within 24 hours of its occurrence. A record of all such events shall be entered in the driver s Safety File. This is true of both CDL and non-CDL drivers under The Company s policy. 

Assuming that enforcement is justified, it would appear that the FRA already has the powers that it needs. Under the 1994 Safety Assurance and Compliance Program the FRA has established a procedure where the FRA s concerns are reported to management and unions. Railroads then have to prepare a one-year plan of action, a remediation plan to correct the alleged deficiencies. The FRA withholds imposing any fines or penalties for violations found while the railroad is making a good-faith effort to implement their remediation plan. 

Putting in place a fair policy of incentives/checks and penalties. The desire to reduce errors and violations leads to a desire to maximise transparency while preserving a system of penalties for the most unacceptable cases. A consensus among the social partners on this system of transparency and sanctions is vital to the success of the safety plan. How will the system reward actors who submit reports, who will be involved (the Board and the management should be involved, and so should front-line actors), what are the real criteria defining what is unacceptable, particularly under suboptimal economic conditions in which the enterprise has to take more risks in order to survive All these points must be included and discussed in the safety plan. 

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