Safety ontology

Figure 4. Safety Ontology as an Extension of Trust Ontology...

Safety Data Management Accident Near-miss Data Management Failure Abnormal Data Management Safety Ontology... 

Define all safety terminologies within safety ontology server Analyze the safety regulations so that it can be searched, inquired, and/or reported... 

Manage Safety Ontology "New List of Safety Terminology is Downloaded From Internet" "New List of Safety Terminology is Developed" "List of Equivalent Safety Terminology" "List of Not-Used Safety Terminology"... 

Safety Ontology Term, Description, Alternatives, Linked Terms Download from PSP Develop by plant expert personnel Maintain by CAPE-SAFE modules... 

Keywords Trust Case Safety Security Privacy IT infrastructure Trust ontology... 

The diagram shown in Figure 1 introduces a high level ontology of trust. It can be further specialized by expanding possible trust objectives and showing how they interrelate. Such trust objectives could include Safety, Honesty, Competence, Security, Privacy, Accountability, Reliability, and so on. 

Roles of Ontology in Automated Process Safety Analysis... 

In PHASuite, the main required information can be divided into four types material, P ID, chemistry and operating procedures. Based on various types of information, ontologies have been developed for operation related and safety related information. 

Keywords ITS, traffic management, safety management, information model, ontology. 

Future research work is to realize an ontology, and a formal information model, for traffic management and safety management within ITS. In order to understand parts needed to support our safety loop the ontology has to be investigated in the light of a simulation environment, model driven software development and tested at run time in an ITS station. To close the loop, diagnostic information collected at run time should be feed back into the simulation environment. 

To put it simply the ontology of Safety-1 cannot be sustained. Or rather, Safety-1 thinking is no longer universally applicable. We must keep in mind that even if we limit the focus to traditional safety concerns, this way of thinking was developed almost a century ago. The Domino model was described in a book published in 1931, but the experiences that led to the ideas and theories described in the book were from the preceding decades. The thinking that was relevant for the work environments at the beginning of the twentieth century is unlikely to be relevant today when socio-technical systems are not decomposable, bimodal, or predictable. 

The purpose of the deconstruction of Safety-I was to find out whether the assumptions are still valid - which in turn means whether the perspective offered by Safety-1 remains valid. The deconstruction of Safety-1 showed that the phenomenology refers to adverse outcomes, to accidents, incidents and the like that the aetiology assumes that adverse outcomes can be explained in terms of cause-effect relationships, either simple or composite and that the ontology assumes that fundamentally something can either function or malfunction. 

The ontology of Safety-II is consistent with the fact that many socio-technical systems have become so complicated that work situations are always underspecified, hence partially unpredictable. Because most socio-technical systems are intractable, work conditions will nearly always differ from what has been specified or prescribed. This means that little, if anything, can be done unless work - tasks and tools - are adjusted so that they correspond to the situation. Performance variability is not only normal and necessary but also indispensable. The adjustments are made by people individually and collectively, as well as by the organisation itself. Everyone, from bottom to top, must adjust what they do to meet existing conditions (resources and requirements). Because the resources of work (time, information, materials, equipment, the presence and availability of other people) are finite, such adjustments will always be approximate rather than perfect. The approximation means that there is inevitably a small discrepancy between what ideally should have been done, or the perfect adjustment, and what is actually done. Yet the discrepancy is usually so small that it has no negative consequences or can be compensated for by downstream adjustments. This is so regardless of whether the discrepancy is found in one s own work or in the work of others. 

The ontology of Safety-II is thus that human performance, individually or collectively, always is variable. This means that it is neither possible nor meaningful to characterise components in terms of whether they have worked or have failed, or whether the functioning is correct or incorrect. The bimodality principle of Safety-I is therefore obsolete. 

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