Safety management HAZOP study

The HAZOP technique can be used to identity human error potential. From a practical point of view, human error and its consequences can occur at all levels of a management structure as well as in the operation of a particular plant or process. Carried out correctly, Technica54 states that a HAZOP study will identify at least 70-75 percent of potential operational and safety problems associated with a particular design process, including human error. 

Risk identification may be achieved by a multiplicity of techniques, including physical inspections, management and worker discussions, safety audits, job safety analysis, and Hazop studies. The study of past accidents can also identify areas of high risk. 

A HAZOP study requires a multi-disciplinary approach by a team made up of technical specialists, i.e. chemical engineer, chemist, production manager, instrumentation engineer, safety adviser, etc. It is co-ordinated by a leader who guides the systematic investigation into the effects of the various faults that could occur and their effects. The success of this study depends heavily on the quality of the leader and the positive and constructive attitude of the team members. It is essential that the team have all the basic data plus line diagrams, flow charts etc. 

ISB (2009a) DSCN 14/2009 Application of patient safety risk management to the manufacture of health software. Information Standards Board for Health and Social Care ISB (2009b) DSCN 18/2009 Application of patient safety risk management to the deployment and use of health software. Information Standards Board for Health and Social Care MoD (1986) Def Stan 00-58 HAZOP studies on systems containing programmable electronics (withdrawn). Ministry of Defence... 

Even participating in the development of a safety management system can be an issue. The Australian authority, NOPSA, had initially participated in some of the operators Hazard Identification (HAZID) and Hazard Operability (HAZOP) studies. However, they concluded that doing so compromised their independence ... 

In the previous chapter, it was established that in industry, plant hazards can cause harm to property (plant—machinery, asset), people, or the environment. So, it is important to develop some means of analyzing these and come up with a solution. Unfortunately, it is not as straightforward as it sounds. There are plenty of plant hazard analysis (PHA) techniques and each of them has certain strengths and weaknesses. Also each specific plant and associated hazard has specific requirements to be matched so that hazard analysis will be effective. In this chapter, various hazards (in generic terms) will be examined to judge their importance, conditions, quality, etc. so that out of so many techniques available for PHA it is possible to select which one is better (not the best because that needs to be done by experts specifically for the concerned plant) suited for the type of plant. So, discussion will be more toward evaluation of PHA techniques. Some PHA is more suited for process safety management (PSM) and is sometimes more applicable for internal fault effects [e.g., hazard and operability study (HAZOP)]. In contrast, hazard identification (HAZID) is applicable for other plants, especially for the identification of external effects and maj or incidents. HAZID is also covered in this chapter. As a continuation of the same discussion, it will be better to look at various aspects of risk analysis with preliminary ideas already developed in the previous chapter. In risk analysis risk assessment, control measures for safety management systems (SMSs) will be discussed to complete the topic. 

G. Mckay, Process Safety Management and Risk Hazard Analysis, HAZOP study analysis course Internet document. 

Overall, then, the only additional RMP requirement for plants already covered by the OSHA process safety management regulation is the hazard assessment (including offsite consequence analyses of worst-case and non-worst-case accidental release scenarios). This hazard assessment must not be confused with the process hazard analysis (PHA). The hazard assessment is a study of what will happen in the event of an accidental release and usually includes, for exanple, air dispersion simulations. The PHA (e.g., HAZOP) studies the hazards present in the process and seeks to minimize them through redesign or modifications to operating procedures. 

One of the problems associated with the final hazop studies is that new SIS functions are often introduced at a late stage of the plant design. These additions must be captured into the existing records for the SLC phases 3 and 4. Hence the draft hazard and risk analysis will have to be updated along with the SRS and safety allocation records. It is the task of the person responsible for managing the SLC to see that all new additions are properly recorded. 

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