Reduction physical

This consists of weight reduction, physical activity, moderation of dietary sodium and high dietary potassium intake. Implementation of lifestyle modifications should not delay the start of effective antihypertensive drug therapy. Patients with renal insufficiency with proteinuria greater than 1 g/day should be treated to a BP goal of 125/75 mmHg ... 

McLaughlin, B. 1992, The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism, In Emergence or Reduction Essays on the Prospect of a Non-Reductive Physicalism, Beckerman, A. Flohr, H. Kim J., Eds. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1992, pp. 49-93, quoted from p. 54-55. 

Reductive chain physicalism was the only version of physicalism in its early days, and it still has hold on some people. It was the mind-body problem which has has led to the emergence of another version of the doctrine, non-reductive physicalism. By the seventies, many people came to believe that the mental cannot be reduced, but it should not be eliminated. So they looked for a different way to elaborate physicalism, and they found it in the notion of the supervenience. They formulate the doctrine as saying that everything supervenes on the physical. 

To show that internal realism is indeed compatible with non-reductive physicalism, we have to consider the central theses of internal realism. Let us begin with (IR1), which asserts that the structure of the world is ontologically dependent... 

Stephan, A. 1992. Emergence a Systematic View on its Historical Facets. In Beckermann, A., Flohr, H. and Kim, J. (eds.), Emergence or Reduction Essays on the Prospectsfor Non-Reductive Physicalism. Berlin Walter de Gruyter, 25-48. 

This model would have to have both physical and mental variables (P and M) which causally overdetemined an event. So say we had a model Mp that provided a sufficient actual cause for event E, and we had another model A/m that also provided a sufficient actual cause for that same event. Now imagine we can create a model Mpm to describe the causation of E, which takes variable from both Mm and Mp. Within this model, E would be causally overdetermined by variables from M and P because there would be two sufficient actual causes within the same model. But Weslake argues that under the assumptions of interventionism and non-reductive physicalism, no such causal model can exist (2007 12). 

Physicalism comes in two varieties reductive physicalism (RP) and nonreductive physicalism (NRP). RP claims contrary to (3) that every real, or as I will say genuine, property (G-property) that has instances in our world (or any physically possible world) is identical to a physical G-property. NRP claims that some mental properties are G-properties that are not identical to any physical G-properties. If events are, as Kim and I think, instantiations of G-properties, then there are mental events that are not identical to physical events but that are nonetheless real. Mental causation says that some of these mental events cause physical events. It is pretty obvious that NRP is committed to causal overdetermination. Later, we will look at how Kim formulates an argument that makes this commitment explicit and attempts to refute it. 

Although Chalmers is skeptical about explicit definitions, his scrutability framework shares the features of the Canberra Plan that I will be criticizing. The key similarity with the Canberra Plan is that reductive accounts are always accounts of determination by the reductive base without consideration of the ground of similarities in cases in which similar facts are determined by different reductive bases. In other words, Chalmers s vision of the reductive physicalism that he rejects does not require that phenomenological similarities with different scrutability bases be explained by physical similarities in the scrutability bases. 

Judging from his (2005), Kim might agree about his earlier view. In the 2005 book, he poses the issue of reducibility starkly, saying, That a property is functionalizable, that is, it can be defined in terms of causal role -is necessary and sufficient for functional reducibility. It is only when we want to claim that the property has been reduced... that we need to have identified its physical realizer (p. 165). He then goes on to pose the question of whether mental properties are functionalizable. The answer... is yes and no. No for qualitative characters of experience, or qualia , and yes, or probably yes, for the rest (p. 165). No for qualitative characters of experience because of inverted-spectrum issues — it is metaphysically possible for functionally identical states to be different in qualitative character. The overall argument is that reductive physicalism fails for qualia — because they don t fit Kim s picture of reductive physicalism. However, there is another picture of reductive physicalism that has some merit, to which I turn in the next section. 

Thinking of reductive physicalism in terms of theoretical identities is more conducive to grounding than the picture of reductive physicalism embedded in the Canberra Plan. But identities are not grounding claims. Identity is symmetrical and grounding is not. The identity claim that... 

The Canberra Plan is supposed to be a model of reductive physicalism, but it neglects ground, sacrificing what I am calling metaphysics on the altar of ontology. In particular, it has no room for an account of the physicalistic ground of mentality. I mentioned that the kind of reductive physicalism acknowledged by the Canberra Plan is blind to the dualistic implications of the Commander Data case, so the account of reductive physicalism is inadequate. 

The next two chapters apply the core notion and a few derivative notions to reduction debates in the philosophy of mind (Chap. 6) and the philosophy of science (Chap. 7). Type-identity theories, token-identity theories, conceptions of non-reductive physicalism, and the model of functional reduction can easily be reconstructed based on the explication proposed here, sometimes in an improved form (for example, on the view presented here, it becomes immediately clear where the directionality stems from - an aspect that has been ignored in the heat of the... 

In Emergence or reduction Essays on the prospects of non-reductive physicalism, ed. Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr, and Jaegwon Kim, 157-179. Berlin de Gruyter. 

Now, type identity theories have been extensively criticized. Physicalists opposed to type-identity theory usually conceive of themselves as non-reducHve physicalists. Interestingly, understanding what non-reductive physicalism consists in requires us to understand what this doctrine is opposed to - namely, reductionism about (mental) types. Moreover, non-reductive physicalists often describe themselves as token-identity theorists, they assume that mental tokens reduce to physical tokens, so that there is strong unity at the token-level. Again, a notion of identity-based reduction is required to hilly understand this idea. The explication offered here cannot only be fruitfully applied in the context of type identity theory. The next section is dedicated to the connection between the explication of reduction and token identity theories. 

The notions of type- and token-reduction introduced here bear upon an appropriate understanding of anti-reductionist aspirations in the context of ontological non-reductive physicalism If we assume that there are different, irreducible kinds of properties, but still assume that token- or substance monism is true, then we could use the notion of token-reduction and type-reduction to capture this idea. Non-reductive physicalism, in its ontological version, consists in the affirmation of token-reduction and the denial of type-reduction for the relevant class of tokens and types. The explication proposed above enables us to give an idea of what reductive type- and token-identity theories consist in, and, combing the two, it yields a characterization of non-reductive physicalism. The next sections discuss the application of the explication of reduction to more recent versions of type-identity theory. 

The explication proposed in the first part of this book sheds light on conceptions in the philosophy of mind, such as various conceptions of type identity theory, token identity theory and non-reductive physicalism. We thereby motivated the explication - it is not only adequate, but also fruitfiil. 

This is not to say that Kim supports either emergence or non-reductive physicalism. In fact he argues that non-reductive physicalism in particular represents an unstable position (Kim, 1999). 

This sense of naive realism is sometimes explained in terms of Eddington s table . As Eddington wrote, if we remain at the macroscopic level, a wooden table appears to be solid and impenetrable. But if we consider the view from the perspective of a reductive physics, we learn that the atoms that make up the table are mostly empty space, a view that appears difficult to reconcile with the solidity of the table. 

This article aims to offer a preliminary introduction to the rough ground of the ontology of chemistry. Although chemistry has often been described as the study of the transformation of substances, there is no generally agreed upon definition of (chemical) substance. In this article we will address the variety and classification of a great variety of stuff. No sharp line will be drawn between the physical, chemical, and material sciences. The issue of the nature of the relations between different levels (molar, molecular, quantum mechanical, etc.) is not addressed here (see the article on Reduction, Physicalism, and Supervenience in Part 5 of this Volume). In this article all such levels are assumed to be equally real. 

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