Ontological reductionism

These are only some of the many examples which show that the concepts of ontological reduction and of ontological dependence are completely meaningful and have a venerable tradition in the history of philosophy and of science. On the basis of this tradition we, as philosophers of science, are entitled to use them, even with the purpose of rejecting ontological reductionism. 

Whereas in the philosophy of mind the notion of reduction is frequently treated as the basis for ontological reductionism, this is a thesis that is not of primary interest for most parts of current philosophy of science. The distinction between reduction debates in the philosophy of science and in the philosophy of mind rests on an idealization, but it nicely illustrates two different tendencies in the two fields. One of the main differences between the philosophy of science debate and the debate in the philosophy of mind becomes apparent when we read the very first sentence of Jerry Fodor s (1974) seminal paper ... 

Alex Rosenberg That s a critical question because there are at least some defenders of emergentism and anti-reductionism who have distinguished sharply between causation as an ontological phenomena and explanation as epistemological and say that though physicalism is true, that is, we are nothing but matter and motion, nevertheless, the best explanations of our behaviour will not be physical. Bob ... 

In this paper we discuss a number of issues which manifest the theoretical particularity of quantum chemistry and which are usually not discussed in an explicit manner either in the historical or in the philosophical studies related to quantum chemistry. We shall focus on five issues the re-thinking of the problem of reductionism, the discourse of quantum chemistry as a confluence of the traditions of physics, chemistry, and mathematics, the role of textbooks in consolidating this discourse, the ontological status of resonance, and the more general problem of the status of the chemical bond. Finally, we shall briefly discuss the impact of large scale computing. 

The ontological autonomy of chemistry is tied with the failure of (at least some versions of) reductionism. Indeed, if all chemical laws are obtainable from quantum-mechanical laws, then how could the belief in the autonomy of this discipline be maintained Since emergence makes possible the existence of sui generis chemical properties, laws, and explanations, it is natural to think that emergence can justify the ontological autonomy of chemistry. 

The way Smart s anonymous opponent conceives of the connection between identity statements and conceptual necessity is, to some extent, mimicked by a way of talking according to which kinds or types are more kin to concepts as conceived of here than to non-representational entities. The idea that there is a conceptual connection between the mental and the physical is tied to a fa on de parler that can be found in various parts of the debate on reductionism and type-identity theory, according to which we can analyze kinds, events or states in functional terms (cf. Block 1995 Kim 2005, 167 Jackson 2005). Type-identity theorists hold that mental types or kinds or properties are identical to physical types or kinds or properties. This suggests that mental kinds and physical kinds are non-representational objects - an interpretation that seems rather plausible given that type-identity theory is a metaphysical theory. Necessarily, there are no conceptual connections between kinds (or non-representational worldly entities), just because kinds are not the right sort of entities to instantiate conceptual relations in any nonderivative way. Kinds are the subject of ontological claims about mental properties. 

The properties of macroscopic matter are related to the properties of its microscopic units. This is in agreement with the statement that the whole is nothing but the sum of its parts. The problem is what the sum of its parts means. Following Dirac, molecular properties are defined by the laws of quantum mechanics, although the application of these laws is much too complicated. But this is relatively unimportant since in principle a Laplace demon could easily solve them. For this reason the philosophers claim that Chemistry is a minor and unripe science, since the whole chemistry can be derived from the more comprehensive first principles of quantum mechanics. Therefore they are used to describe chemistry in terms of ontological or epistemological reductionism, the difference between the two approaches being unimportant in this context [10-12],... 

Perhaps the most appropriate place to begin our analysis is with the issue of reductionism, due to the unique ontological relationship that exists between chemistry and physics. Indeed, it is the closeness of this relationship that has probably led many philosophers of science to assume that the reduction of chemistry to physics is both trivial and inevitable. But does chemistry provide such a paradigm case for reductionism And, if so, why have so many chemists (and even physicists) been reluctant to eclipse the concerns of chemistry with those of physics Or, does the relationship between chemistry and physics instead highlight a case where despite ontological dependency, we wish to preserve the epistemological and explanatory autonomy of our original subject ... 

At first brush, one may think that the close ontological relationship between chemistry and physics would inevitably bias chemical explanation in favor of reductionism. We shall see, however, that there is good reason to support the autonomy of chemical explanations. That is, even if we admit that chemical regularities are instantiated in physical relationships, it may be most useful, perhaps, to describe and explain them at the chemical (secondary) level of inquiry. 

Thus, although reductionism may fail in the traditional sense (that is, although there may be a breakdown in our efforts to establish a seamless continuity between the special sciences and quantum mechanics), we yet can maintain that, deep down, chemical or biological systems are governed solely by physical laws. Materialism is rescued, even though reduction has been found to flounder. Moreover, we need not appeal to ontological... 

Mendeleev s philosophical views relating to the philosophy of chemistry can be broken down into three general areas questions of ontology concerning fundamental entities in chemistry questions of reductionism and the relation between physics and chemistry and questions of the character of natural laws. The categorizations and language used throughout this section, unless specified otherwise, are the present author s and not Mendeleev s. 

If we look at Eric Scerri s approach to the question of reductionism, we see that he not only rejects hard reductionism, which aims to explain all chemical phenomena in terms of quantum mechanics, but also the fallback soft position that posits an ontological dependence without demanding reduction at the level of explanation. Instead, he proposes a third option that consists in defending the autonomy of chemistry by proclaiming that the debate involves different levels of reality that are autonomous though interconnected . In particular, he emphasizes the difference between the orbitals as they are used by chemists and those dealt with by physicists working in quantum theory. Indeed, Scerri maintains that chemistry teachers should specify that the orbitals that they are talking about are not those of modern quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, it is probable that this... 

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