Fodor, Jerry

Fodor, Jerry A. 1974. Special sciences Orthe disunity of science as a working hypothesis. Synthese 28 97-115. 

Fodor, Jerry A. 1981. Representations Philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science. Cambridge, MA MIT Press. 

Fodor, Jerry A. 1975. The language of thought. New York Thomas CroweU. 

Fodor, Jerry A. 1997. Special sciences StiU autonomous after all these years. NoAs Supplement Philosophical Perspectives 11, Mind, Causation, and World il. 149-163. 

An excellent review of Do Animals Think can be found in Clayton, Nicola, An Open Sandwich or an Open Question Science 305(5682) 344, July 18, 2004. Here, Nicola discusses the work of Clive Wynne, Euan Macphail, and Jerry Fodor. 

For some considerations against Alexander s Dictum (as Kim understands it), see Sabat s (2003). Jerry Fodor s phrase, from Fodor (1974). See Davidson (1970b). 

Block, Ned, and Jerry A. Fodor. 1972. What psychological states are not. Philosophical Review 81 159-181. 

Whereas in the philosophy of mind the notion of reduction is frequently treated as the basis for ontological reductionism, this is a thesis that is not of primary interest for most parts of current philosophy of science. The distinction between reduction debates in the philosophy of science and in the philosophy of mind rests on an idealization, but it nicely illustrates two different tendencies in the two fields. One of the main differences between the philosophy of science debate and the debate in the philosophy of mind becomes apparent when we read the very first sentence of Jerry Fodor s (1974) seminal paper ... 

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