Nimrod accident

Some form of subtle, low-key and indirect political interference may also have been going on in developments that led to the Nimrod accident (Chapter 9). The RAF Nimrods were near the end of their operational lives when safety reviews were initiated on all aircraft. The translation by civil servants of politically driven financial constraints into detailed work plans meant that contractors were told to do a quick and cheap safety review on the Nimrod, and they were apparently expected not to find anything significantly wrong. As a result, major safety deficiencies were overlooked. One possible conclusion is this You do not have to live in a dictatorship to feel political interference. 

A second type of dysfunctional safety culture might be termed a paperwork culture. In these organizations, employees spend all their time proving the system is safe but little time actually doing the things necessary to make it so. After the Nimrod aircraft loss in Afghanistan in 2006, the accident report noted a culture of paper safety at the expense of real safety [78]. 

Most of the accidents described in this book are about failures of safety management, in some way or other. One example of particularly bad safety management over many years is described next - the sad story of the Royal Air Force Nimrod fire and crash in Afghanistan in 2006, where multiple organizational and safety culture faihngs were to blame. 

Timeline of key events leading to the Nimrod XV230 accident, with extracts from the Hadden-Cave report. 

BAE Systems sought to share blame for these design mistakes by stating that the design modifications had been accepted by the Ministry of Defence in 1977-1978. Haddon-Cave did not consider that this absolved BAE Systems of its responsibility in respect of the poor design of the aircraft. The cross-feed/SCP duct represented a fundamental flaw in the design of the Nimrod aircraft and was the primary physical cause of the accident. 

A Nimrod Project Safety Working Group (PSWG) was established, reporting to the Integrated Project Team Leader, to produce the Nimrod safety case in the period 2001-2005 (i.e before the accident). The Nimrod Project Safety Working Group therefore had a marvelous opportunity to identify and perhaps rectify the fire hazards in the No. 7 Tank Dry Bays, but it failed to do so. 

Haddon-Cave named three individuals in BAE Systems, three individuals in the Ministry of Defence Nimrod Integrated Project Team, and two individuals in QinetiQ Ltd as the key people in the debacle of the Nimrod safety case. The best opportunity to capture these serious design flaws in the Nimrod fleet, that had lain dormant for the decades before the accident to the XV230, was squandered. ... 

Haddon-Cave noted parallels between Nimrod and other major accidents such as the capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry, the King s Cross fire, BP Texas... 

Accidents such as Nimrod lead to very thorough investigations and great soul-searching amongst all the people involved, directly and indirectly. 

Prior to the accident, concerns were raised by people who knew what they were talking about (QinetiQ) to those in positions of authority - and those concerns were rebuffed. The apparent confidence in the safety of the Nimrod was based on prior successful operation, but the apparent confidence was at least partially a bluff project pressures about costs and programs were almost certainly the real drivers. 

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