Identifying Risk in a System

Chapters 5 through 9 are the best sources for tools to identity risk in the system. Once the system is defined, developing a quick preliminary hazard list will detect the gross hazards of concern to the system. The hazard analysis further refines the hazard list and clearly recognizes which hazards are of greatest concern. Also, the Hazard Risk Index is a good qualitative tool with which to note some of the qualitative risks that are required in step 6 of the risk assessment methodology. 

HAZOP and what-if/safety checklists perform the same function as the hazard analysis in the risk assessment process. 

Having done this, the fault tree is extremely useful, especially if it has been quantified. Fault trees are typical inputs to event trees in the nuclear power industry. There is no reason that other industries cannot do the same. 

Later in the risk assessment process, once the scenarios of particular interest are clear, FMEA is a very powerful tool for focusing on which component is the trigger in the event and how to make it more robust in the system. The same is true of sneak circuit analysis, cause-consequence analysis, or dispersion modeling. 

Chapter 5 discusses tracking hazards to closure. A sample facility hazard analysis template is shown. Many safety and risk experts will use the term risk register. It is essentially the same thing. Table 13.2 illustrates an example risk register. 

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