False belief tasks

These results indicate that once children pass false-belief tasks they also improve in their ability to search their own mind for appropriate problem solutions. In addition to correlations with creativity, verbal and non-verbal intelligence, other studies have found further associations with non-social abilities such as working memory (Davis Pratt 1995), pantomime (Suddendorf et al 1999, Taylor Carlson 1997) and causal reasoning (Frye et al 1998). These findings fly in the face of the claim that there is an encapsulated theory of mind module. Indeed, the very idea that the human mind is characterized by new, independent, domain-specific modules seems to contradict the observation that the human mind is flexible and generative in its thoughts, actions and words (Corballis 2000). In regards to theory of mind, for example, we are quite happy to use the intentional stance beyond the social sphere (e.g., when we use mental terms to explain the actions of animals, plants and even machines). 

The important point in the present context is that these cognitive abilities do not come for free. It is clear that high levels of intensionality are extremely difficult to cope with in computational terms. Kinderman et al. (in press), for example, tested normal adults with a series of tests similar to those used in standard ToM tests but which allowed for up to fifth order intensionality (as opposed to the conventional second order of standard ToM false belief tests). At the same time, subjects were also given tests of environmental causal relationships that required only memory of a sequence of events. Memory tests involved causal relationships of up to sixth orders of embeddness ( A caused B which caused C which. caused F ). Error rates on memory tasks varied fairly uniformly between 5-15% across the six levels of embeddness with no significant trends in contrast, error rates on the ToM tasks increased exponentially with order of embeddness (i.e. intensionality). 

In a manic episode the need for less sleep is almost always seen, so that the individual may rise hours earlier than normal yet stiU be full of enei. Indeed, the person may not sleep for days but feel no fatigue. Another common symptom is overly high self-confidence. The individual may attempt complex and difficult tasks for which he or she has no experience or knowledge, such as sailing around the world or climbing Mount Everest. The person may also have grandiose delusions (false beliefs that do not seem possible) about himself or herself. Rapid and loud speech that is difficult to interrupt is also a common symptom. Speech will often show a pressured quality as if the person is compelled to speak, so that an individual may talk a lot. 

The propriety of this kind of mental leaping is one of the most controversial aspects of toxic tort and occupational disease cases, where causation often cannot be properly formulated as a yes-or-no fact. Instead, parties rely on evidence of increased risk or enhanced probability of disease which may or may not be attributable to defendant s conduct. The inquiry becomes one of the existence and magnitude of a fact probability. Therefore, understanding the dual nature of probability, as both a factual statistical quantity (fact probability) and a measure of strength of belief (belief probability), becomes important. Unfortunately, fact probability and belief probability have not been kept analytically distinct. Courts have collapsed the requirements for burden of production and burden of persuasion into one test that blurs plaintiff s twofold task of defining not only the facts or elements to be proved but also the amount of credence to be accorded a fact in support of a finding. When a judge tells a jury that plaintiff must show that causation is more likely than not, she/he risks confusion. Does she/he mean that the fact of causation which plaintiff must prove (burden of production) is not traditional true-or-false (100% vs. 0%)... 

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