Denial of service attacks

With increasingly networked, distributed computer systems the risk of deliberate malicious interactions, using software-based tools, became a serious threat. Many-fold related issues like data protection, privacy, integrity, authenticity, and denial of service attacks, viruses, worms etc. lead to a separate community to be established, which is nowadays in the main focus of the public as was safety some time ago (and still is—but only after catastrophic events). This community developed separate standards, methods, taxonomy and ways of thinking. 

Lee, H., K. Park, On the Effectiveness of Probabilistic Packet Marking for IP Traceback Under Denial of Service Attack, Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM 2001, Anchorage, Alaska, April 22-26, 2001, New York IEEE Computer Society Press, 338-347. 

The Backscatter identification is quite straightforward. Indeed, backscatter packets are responses to connections requests issued by spoofed IP addresses, typically in the case of a Denial of Service attack against a third party. If our addresses are used (spoofed) in the course of this attack, we will see the responses of the victim sent to us without us having talked to him first. These attacks have been very well-analyzed by Moore et al. in [43], [44], Figure 9 summarizes the various types of responses (column response from victim ) that can be sent against our honeypots. These packets hit a large variety of ports that are traditionally unused, such as 27374 (TCP RST), 11224 (TCP SYN ACK), 9026 (RST ACK), etc. 

Information exchange processes in a communication infrastructure can be modeled as transactions that have to fulfill the ACID properties. If a transaction does not properly proceed and finish, the ACID properties provide a direct categorization of the related anomaly. Based on this categorization, appropriate and effective countermeasures can be applied. A direct violation of the atomicity property, for example, corresponds to a denial-of-service attack, as the transaction is not completed and therefore the requested service is not provided. A buffer overflow represents a violation of consistency, and a race condition a violation of isolation. Other attacks can be classified accordingly. The corresponding anomalies can be detected by comparing protocol and process runs with the given specifications, which are represented by extended finite state machines. 

Availability protects systems from denial-of-service attacks. 

DDLs (data definition languages), 119 DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks, 278... 

Geng, X., and Whinston, A. B. (2000), Dynamic Pricing with Micropayment Using Economic Incentive to Solve Distributed Denial of Service Attack, Center for Research in Electronic Commerce, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX. 

Moreover, libtiff is vulnerable to a denial of service attack by a remote user using a TIFF image producing division by zero. If this is the case the attacker could be able to crash the server. Fortunately, there are available fixing packages for this vulnerability, but testing for vulnerability is also necessary in order to vaUdate the DlSTeFAX software. 

Denial of Service Attacks (Loch Carr, 1992 Cheswick Bellovin, 1994 Icove et al., 1995 NIST, 1997 CyberProtect, 1999 Warren Hutchinson, 2000 NSW Guideline, 2003 Whitman, 2003 Spekman Davis, 2004) PasswordSniffing/Cracking Software (Amoroso, 1994 Icove et al., 1995 Cohen, 1997 CyberProtect, 1999 Warren Hutchinson, 2000)... 

The solution that we propose does not completely remove the need for some sort of global functionality during the voting process we require the use of clocks that are synchronized between election locations but demonstrate that this solution is much more robust against a denial of service attack. 

In 2000, Hoffman asked Internet Voting Willit Spur or Corrupt Democracy [ 6], and commented on the perceived risk of denial-of-service attacks Imagine what a concerted denial of service attack might do to an election with Internet/Web-based voting. .. . 

In 2004, Selker and Goler report on The SAVE system — secure architecture for voting electronically[Sl] This voting architecture provides a means to vote over open networks in a way that is reliable, secure, and private. Their proposal is based on demonstrating that — through n-version redundancy techniques — there is no single point of failure in their system. However, their proposed architecture is not robust against denial-of-service attacks. 

The design of a secure (coercion-free) remote e-voting system is proposed in Civitas A Secure Remote Voting System[lQ. The paper addresses one of the major problems with remote voting how can one ensure that voters cannot be coerced when the voting location is unsupervised In particular they use the requirement that voters cannot prove whether or how they voted, even if they can interact with the adversary while voting. It should be noted that the architecture may be susceptible to denial-of-service attacks Civitas does not guarantee availability of either election authorities or the results of an election. 

We have developed a prototype of an innovative voting system and addressed the major problem of denial-of-service attacks in a distributed architecture. 

Consider, for example, a scenario where an adversary launches a denial-of-service attack against a defended computer system. The attack produces deviations in application control flow, network traffic, and CPU utilization. Automated analyzers study observations (gained from the suite of cyber sensors) and notice that the deviations are indicative of an attack. The analyzers subsequently publish this intelligence to the relevant decision mediators. The decision mediators survey the analyses and guesses which information will be most useful to the decision maker. In this example, the decision mediator forms a belief that the analysis of CPU utilization will be most useful to its decision maker. The decision mediator then presents an abridged form of the analyses to the decision maker, emphasizing the importance of the CPU-utilization analysis. In addition, the mediator also presents a set of suggested responses to the decision maker. 

In our demonstration we use a limited adversary model where an adversary used a single denial-of-service attack. During warfare, we expect real adversaries to launch a multitude of attacks targeting all components of the BMD OODA loop. Further, we should also expect non-DOS attacks, such as disinformation attacks and attacks against the Cyber OODA loop. 

In this scenario. Agent initiates the attack, and then the router propagates the attack initiation signal to nodes physically linked with the router. Then, a denial of service attack is performed on the avionics server. The next step of the scenario is FW.T bypass , which means that the firewall is deactivated. In the last step the denial of service attack is propagated to the gateway. 

CERT Coordination Center. 1998. CERT Advisory CA-1998-01 Smurf IP Denial-of-Service Attacks. Available online at . 

When we talk about availability in the context of security it is not possible to provide the service to everyone due to limited resources and possible denial-of-service attacks. Availability can be expressed with the predicate availauMsericd, u, a) similar to the availability requirement considering random faults. 

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