Voting system

Three non-eontaeting probes for measuring and monitoring the axial displaeement shall be supplied with proximitors and intereonneeting wires. The signals shall eause shutdown of the expander train based on a 2-out-of-3 voting system. 

The expander shall be equipped with an eleetronie overspeed trip. The piekups shall sense the rotation of a 30-tooth wheel and be eonneeted to a 2-out-of-3 voting system. 

A eombination of deteetors may be appropriate. They may aetivate an alarm only, or aetuate a eombined alarm/extinguishment system. With a bank of deteetors a voting system may be used to inerease reliability and reduee the frequeney of spurious alarms. Deteetion/alarm systems may also be interlinked with, e.g., fire-eheek doors held baek on eleetromagnetie eatehes sueh that the doors elose automatieally upon aetivation of the deteetion system. 

Cutts, Q., A. Carbone, and K. van Haaster (2004) Using an electronic voting system to promote active reflection on coursework feedback. Proceedings of the International Conference on Computers in Education, Melbourne, Australia, November 30-December 3,2004. 

Virginia Valian I will address your last point first. Schemas are unlikely to differ enough from one culture to another to give us any hope that we will find a culture where there is no problem with gender equity. Certainly there are cultural and subcultural differences in exactly how gender schemas are constituted and how they play out. There are odd separations in terms of things like political representation, for example, in which this country—at least at the national level—has a very poor record compared with some other countries (in part because of different voting systems). But in terms of other measures we do somewhat better than other countries. 

This paper examines five different voting systems, all extensions of simple majority rule, with respect to eight conditions such systems should meet. The eight conditions are those that remain after eliminating conditions which are satisfied or violated by all five procedures. The results of this paper may be used by individuals to determine what procedure is best. 

Tripping heat input to the reboiler The use of a single temperature or pressure cutoff cannot be relied on for tripping heat input (60) it may not function when the failure occurs. Two incidents have been reported (239), one where a pressure trip failed to operate and avoid overpressure, the other where a temperature trip behaved similarly. The use of two temperatvire or pressure cutoff switches, with one of them sufficient to trip the heat input, is more reliable, but is generally not recommended because it is likely to induce spurious trips. One satisfactory system that can often be relied on for reducing the relief requirements (60, 414) includes three or more (redundant) switches, with a "voting system. This may be expensive, but the expense can often be justified. 

They will typically have two levels of alarm 20% LFL and 60% lower flammable limit (LFL). If multiple detectors are installed in a single location then a voting system can be installed. For example, if just one 20% alarm sounds then all hot work must stop but other work can continue as normal. If three 20% alarms or one 60% alarm sounds, then an emergency response is called for. 

Fire eyes can generate false alarms. If the instrument has internal problems, or if there is smoke or dirt in the furnace, the fire eye may (incorrectly) determine that the flame(s) have gone out, leading to a spurious or nuisance system shutdown. In such situations, it is possible to enhance both safety and reliability by installing three fire eyes, and put their signals through a voting system, in which two of the three must detect a flame-out condition before the furnace is shut down. 

Figure 9.17 shows the fault tree for a so-called 2-out-of-3 voting system, also denoted by 2oo3-voting system. 

If the properties from Eqs. (9.70) to (9.72) are applied to Eq. (9.69) we obtain the probability of failure of the 2-out-of-3 voting system. If the q denote the component failure probabilities the expected value of the system failure probability is... 

Example 9.22 Model for an interruption of flow due to high temperature activated by a 2-out-of-three voting system... 

The described platform is applied to a model which describes part of a safety critical system currently under research. Figure 5 shows the architecture of a two out of three SIL4 voting system used in a safety critical application. Apart from the inclusion of three processors, Filters and the elements of FIK are added to enable the fault injection. 

Ability of a functional unit to continue to perform a required function in the presence of random faults or errors. For example, a one out of two (loo2) voting system can tolerate one random component failure and still perform its function. Fault tolerance is one of the specific requirements for safety integrity level (SIL) and is described in more detail in International Electrotechnical Commission (lEC) 61508 Part 2, Tables 2 and 3, and in lEC 61511 (ISA 84.01 2004) in Clause 11.4. 

The use of electronic voting systems to enhance deep learning... 

Draper, S. W. Brown, M. I. 2004. Increasing interactivity in lectures using an electronic voting system. Journal of Computer Assisted Learning, 20(2) 81. 

Russell, M. 2008. Using an electronic voting system to enhance learning and teaching. Engineering Education, 3(2) 58-65. 

The use of redimdancy in base layer control (e.g. multiple measurements and voting systems) and the use of monitoring tools in the base layer control to improve the availability of the control system. 

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