Chemical Weapons Convention Chemicals Annex

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) opened for signature in Paris, on January 13, 1993 and entered into force on April 29, 1997. Its complexity is reflected in almost 200 pages of text, containing Preamble and 24 Articles and three Annexes On Chemicals (6 p), On Implementation Verification (105 p), and On Protection of Confidential Information (5 p) [2], To the main pillars of the CWC belong ... 

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) provides sampling and analysis as a tool for verification. General procedures to use sampling and analysis are outlined under the general rules of verification in the Verification Annex (VA) Part II paragraph 52-58, special provisions concerning different types of inspections are given in various parts of the VA. 

Statement by the Russian Federation at the First Session of the Conference to Review the Functioning of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The 1 per cent destruction represents the target for the first intermediate destruction deadline, which, according to Part IV(A) of the CWC s Verification Annex, should have been met three years after entry into force. Russia was granted an extension to this deadline by the Executive Council in 2000. 

Source U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). 1993. Defense treaty readiness program. Chemical weapons convention, Annex on chemicals, available at http //www.dtirp.dtra.mil/TlC/treatyinfo/cwc.cfm. 

Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phospboramidates (7) Arsenic trichloride (7784-34-1) Source The Chemical Weapons Convention, "Annex on Chemicals," Part B. 

Bearing in mind that paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article VI of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter the Convention ) and paragraphs 6,13,15,16,17,19, and 20 of Part VI paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of Part VII paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of Part VIII and paragraph 3 of Part IX of the Verification Annex to the Convention (hereinafter the Verification Aimex ) require each State Party to submit the following ... 

Extract of RC-2/S/1 containing a Note by the Technical Secretariat dated 31 March 2008 and entitled Review of the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention since the First Review Conference . The annexes referred to in this Note are not reproduced in this volume. 

Recalling that, according to paragraph 3 of Article VI of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter the Convention ), Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in Schedule 1... to the prohibitions on production, acquisition, retention, transfer and use as specified in Part VI of the Verification Annex. It shall subject Schedule 1 chemicals and facilities specified in Part VI of the Verification Annex to systematic verification through on site inspection and monitoring with on site instruments in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex ... 

C-8/DEC.7 adopted by the Conferenee of the States Parties at its Eighth Session on 23 October 2003 and entitled Understandings regarding declarations under Article VI and Part VII and Part VIII of the Verification Annex to the Chemical Weapons Convention ... 

The Council requested that, in case the provisions of paragraph 27 of Part XI of the Verification Annex to the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter the Verification Annex ) or any other document related thereto and concluded between the OPCW and the United Nations are invoked, the Director-General will promptly inform the Council and all States Parties of the request and of the actions that the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter the Secretariat ) is undertaking to respond to the request. 

Recalling that the Preparatory Commission developed a Draft OPCW Policy on Confidentiality (OPOC) that includes the above mentioned issues as well as rules governing the composition and operating procedures of the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes Related to Confidentiality (hereinafter the Confidentiality Commission ) as required by paragraph 23 the Confidentiality Annex to the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter the the Confidentiality Annex ), in a combined manner ... 

Annex to RC-3/DEC.2 adopted by the Third Review Conference on 8 April 2013 and entitled Amendment of Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the States Parties With Respect to Attendance of Non-Gk>vemmental Organisations at Meetings of Special Sessions of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention ... 

The Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and of their destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC) was signed on January 13, 1993, and entered into force on April 29, 1997. The CWC includes 24 Articles, the Annex on Chemicals, the Annex on Implementation and Verification (so-called Verification Annex), and the Confidentiality Annex. The Verification Annex, which by the length occupies the majority of the CWC, is written in 11 parts. Article I lists the general obligations of the CWC as shown in Figure 1. 

OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) (2005). Annex on Chemicals. In Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, pp. 51M. Technical Secretariat, OPCW. 

Organization for the Prohibition of Weapons, 1994. Annex on chemicals in convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Weapons, pp. 47-54. Available at htpp //dtirp.dtra.mil/IIC/treaty.info/cwc.cfm. 

The Annex on Chemicals to the CWC lists the toxic chemicals and their precursors that are considered a risk to the Convention. This Annex divides the substances into three Schedules or lists. Schedule 1 chemicals pose the highest risk to the Convention many have been developed, produced, stockpiled or used as chemical weapons in the past and they have few if any peaceful uses. Schedule 2 chemicals pose a significant risk to the Convention either because they can be used themselves as chemical weapons or as a consequence of their role as precursors to Schedule 1 or 2 chemicals. Schedule 2 chemicals are also not produced commercially on a large scale. Schedule 3 chemicals are produced in large quantities commercially but pose a risk to the Convention because of their role as precursors to either Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 chemicals. 

Significantly, a state that is party to the Convention has primary responsibility for the disposal and clean-up of chemical weapons abandoned on another state party s territory. As the verification annex of the CWC states, [the] Abandoning State Party shall provide all necessary financial, technical, expert, facility as well as other resources. The Territorial State Party shall provide appropriate cooperation. This is the clause that, for example, obUges Japan to survey the remains of chemical weapons its armies left behind in China and pay the associated costs of disposal. 

Each State Party shall destroy all chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 pursuant to the Verification Annex and in accordance with the agreed rate and sequence of destruction (hereinafter referred to as order of destruction ). Such destruction shall begin not later than two years after this Convention enters into force for it and shall finish not later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention. A State Party is not precluded from destroying such chemical weapons at a faster rate. 

Chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 may be temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons in accordance with Part V, paragraphs 18 to 25, of the Verification Annex. Such a converted facility must be destroyed as soon as it is no longer in use for destruction of chemical weapons but, in any case, not later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention. 

A State Party may request, in exceptional cases of compelling need, permission to use a chemical weapons production facility specified in paragraph 1 for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. Upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, the Conference of the States Parties shall decide whether or not to approve the request and shall establish the conditions upon which approval is contingent in accordance with Part V, Section D, of the Verification Annex. 

Subject to paragraphs 3 to 5, a State Party shall destroy old chemical weapons that have been confirmed by the Technical Secretariat as meeting the definition in Article II, paragraph 5 (b), in accordance with Article IV and Part IV (A) of this Annex. Upon request of a State Party, the Executive Council may, however, modify the provisions on time-limit and order of destruction of these old chemical weapons, if it determines that doing so would not pose a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention. The request shall contain specific proposals for modification of the provisions and a detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed modification. 

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