Chemical and Biological Arms Control

The CWC has a wide scope, defining chemical weapons as munitions or other devices, specifically designed to cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals (but not plants). It thereby encompasses past, known and possible chemical warfare agents, including toxins such as ricin and saxitoxin, and refers, in its preamble, to the principles of international law which prohibit the use of herbicides as a method of warfare. It divides these chemicals and many of their precursors into three categories known as schedules. In Schedule 1, it effectively bans 12 groups of chemicals from manufacturing industry and commerce, 

The treaty requires that chemical attacks should be investigated, and that the victims of such attacks should be assisted (including states parties that feel threatened by activities prohibited under the treaty). It obligates all states parties to proffer assistance, establishes a voluntary fund for this purpose, and indicates procedures for the rapid provision of detection systems, protective equipment, medical antidotes, advice and other assistance. Should the Technical Secretariat uncover evidence of non-compliance, the Executive Council must first consult with the states concerned, and, if necessary, set deadlines for corrective action to be taken. Should these measures prove insufficient, the Executive Council may refer the matter to the Conference of the States Parties, which may decide to recommend a collective response. In cases of particular gravity , the Conference is required to bring the issue before the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council. 

Advocates of the treaty forecast that an immense array of benefits would flow from an international agreement in Geneva. They contended that a treaty would bolster the Geneva Protocol and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, establish legal norms against the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and retention of chemical weapons. 

Commission is still uncertain how much of the Iraqi programme has 

The Iraqi recalcitrance underscored the limitations of what can be legitimately expected of an inspection regime. In spite of the unprecedented powers of the inspectors, sustained political support, the imposition of extensive economic sanctions and flagrant violations of Iraqi sovereignty, UNSCOM officials were still not certain after two years that they had fulfilled their mission completely. As Rolf Ek us concluded, if there was anything to be learnt from this experience, it was that only intrusive, short notice, non-refusal inspections of declared or non-declared locations of the type which the United Nations Special Commission has carried out, would be effective against deliberate concealment and deter potential violators 

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Song Why Non-Lethal Chemical Agents are Lethal. Federation of American Scientists Chemical and Biological Arms Control Program, March 2003... 

Brian M. Jenkins, Understanding the Link Between Motives and Methods, in Brad Roberts (ed.), Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons, Arlington VA The Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute (1997), p. 45. 

Sprinzak, E. (2000). On not overstating the problem. In B. Roberts (Ed.), Hype or reality The new terrorism and mass casualty attacks (p. IS). Alexandria, VA Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute. 

Testimony by Ambassador Donald Mahley, State Department Special Negotiator for Chemical and Biological Arms Control before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, September 13, reprinted... 

Conference Co-Director (USA) - Dr. Kyle Olson, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, Alexandria, VA. 

Ibid., p.43 Pearson, Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control The Web of Deterrence, pp.l46, 148 see also M.Meselson and J. Perry Robinson, Chemical Warfare and Chemical Disarmament , Scientific American vol.242, no.4 (April 1980), pp. 34-43. 

Pearson, Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control The Web of Deterrence , pp.l59-60. 

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