All on Board

The safety culture change journey is a tough, long, and sometimes tedious one. Everyone involved with the organization must be on board or the change will not happen. This change in safety attitudes cannot occur at the worker level only. It must start with the leadership and cascade down to all echelons within the organization, and must involve contractors and temporary employees as well. 

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Decreasing human involvement with increasing automation, e.g. all on-board controls on Satellite. 

Answer This is the reference rail for the entire system. So in fact, all on-board dc-dc converters present in the system usually need to have their respective (power) grounds tied firmly to this system ground. The system ground in turn usually connects to the metal enclosure, and from there on to the earth (safety) ground (i.e. into the mains wiring). 

Answer The voltages applied to and/or received from on-board dc-dc converters are referenced by the rest of the system to the common shared system ground. By modern convention, all voltages are usually expected to be positive with respect to the system ground. Therefore, all on-board dc-dc converters also need to comply with the same convention. And that makes them necessarily positive-to-positive converters. 

It is increasingly clear that eventually, the law is going to place significant additional EMI requirements on all on-board power converters and any power supply, off-line or otherwise, working inside telecom equipment. Therefore, in the not so unforeseeable future, we could soon all be routinely testing the outputs of every power supply in much the same manner as we test their inputs today. In fact even as of now, many of the big telecom equipment manufacturers, of their own volition, routinely comply with CISPR 22 limits on both the inputs and outputs of their telecom power supplies. Of course, instead of the special proposed ISN, they have just gone ahead and used the more readily available input LISN to test the outputs too. 

Credibility of culture change Development of employees and unions Sharing of knowledge Employee empowerment in safety All on board... 

Anticipate and engage all stakeholders. There is much at stake in major curricular reform, and many individuals in positions of responsibility, authority, and personal intellectual investment are available to help, or to hinder, if personal and professional relationships are not thoughtfully developed and nurtured. With all on board, difficulties become minor bumps in the road with key players left wondering what is happening, the same difficulties can become insurmountable obstacles. Collaboratively developed materials are likely to transition successfully to the classroom the same materials inflicted on over-burdened teachers are likely to fail. 

A code of practice has been developed by a number of organisations to assess and set standards of safety and protection for all on board. Moth (1998) provides an easy to use guide to this eode of practice for vessels under 24 m in length. The Code of Practice for the Safety of Small Work Boats and Pilot Boats does not apply to vessels operating on inland waters where such waters form part of a river or are completely self-contained such as a lake or reservoir. In such circumstances, further advice should be sought fi-om the river and/or water authority or the local authority regarding any local requirements that might apply. 

A Boeing 737 on its landing approach to Pittsburgh airport experienced a sudden and uncommanded move of its rudder. The pilot was unable to countermand using other controls. The aircraft crashed with the loss of all on board. 

Upon takeoff from New York JFK Airport fiames were seen streaming from the engines of an Airbus A300 aircraft before it crashed into Jamaica Bay with the loss of all on board. A terrorist attack was suspected. 

Tragically, the 2009 Air France Flight 447, killing all on board, had software contributing to the crash with discrepancies in the indicated airspeed readings. 

The aircraft hit the sea 20 km from the Puerto Plata at 2347 17, and all on board were killed. The entire flight had lasted less than 5 min, and it had been less than three minutes since the alarms mach speed trim and rudder ratio had been received. 

In the second accident, a fire in the hold of an aircraft, which should have been survivable, nevertheless led to the deaths of all on board even after the plane had landed safely. The stressful situation, combined with a poor working relationship... 

All this was read publicly before all on board this ship Capitana whose names were as follows —... 

The aircraft circled, apparently with navigation equipment failure following a total electrical failure. The crew failed to locate their airfield and eventually the aircraft ran out of fuel and hit a low hill. Seven fatalities (all on board). 

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