Accidents safety operating procedures

An inherently safe plant1112 relies on chemistry and physics to prevent accidents rather than on control systems, interlocks, redundancy, and special operating procedures to prevent accidents. Inherently safer plants are tolerant of errors and are often the most cost effective. A process that does not require complex safety interlocks and elaborate procedures is simpler, easier to operate, and more reliable. Smaller equipment, operated at less severe temperatures and pressures, has lower capital and operating costs. 

The root cause of this accident was poor operating procedures and poor process infoiv mation. The operating procedure, for example, did not cover the safety consequences of deviations from the normal operating conditions, such as the possibility of a runaway reaction and the specific steps to be taken to avoid or recover from such deviations. 

The second phase may involve a breakdown of a barrier function. A barrier function is a safety feature such as a shutdown valve or containment system, a procedure, or the communication system. AVhen these safety systems fail, the incident then evolves from an undesirable occurrence to a near miss and, if enough barriers fail, the incident could finally progress to a minor or major accident or operational interruption depending upon the consequences or circumstances. 

MIRADCOM Safety Office. The safety office contains profes-sional safety engineers with considerable experience in dealing with hazardous operations. They maintain up to date knowledge and information on safety equipment and procedures. Files are kept on all accidents and incidents. They review and approve all standard operating procedures and serve as a source of advice and information on all safety matters. 

Standard operating procedures serve several purposes. Foremost, they require that the process be thoroughly planned, all known safety procedures be incorporated, and the operation made as independant as possible of personnel changes. In the event of an incident they aid in pinpointing the step responsible for the accident (i.e. it helps identify the unsafe act). In the event of injury or loss of equipment, it serves as a legal document to show that all known precautions were employed. It serves as a teaching aid for new employees. 

It should also be remembered that most evolving technologies, whether boilers during the 19th century, airplanes in this century, or nuclear plants, entail some accidents from which lessons are learned. Both the Three Mile Island accident, from which only limited radioactivity escaped to the environment, and the Chernobyl disaster, have led to the introduction of new safety features in nuclear reactors, in plant operating procedures, and in regulations. 

A. 19. Operating procedures. A sampling review of operating procedures should be performed, including all the procedures for normal operations, anticipated operational occurrences and accident conditions. Inspections should be focused on the operating personnel s adherence to procedures, including operational limits and conditions. The usability and adequacy of the procedures should also be evaluated. This may necessitate sustained observations in the control room. The inspection programme in this area may necessitate sustained observation to cover 24 hour operation as necessary, in particular shift turnovers. The inspectors should check the availability of safety systems and the presence of alarm systems, and the way in which they are handled by the operations staff... 

Fundamentally, safety is underpinned or undermined by human capabilities and limitations, and to err is human. Accident investigators have moved away from the position of regarding the phrase pilot error as an appropriate explanatory cause. It is far more appropriate to ask why the error was made and why it was not detected and corrected in time, including the creation of barriers (or defensive layers) through the design of suitable interfaces, training, operational procedures etc. 

The Paks Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) experience with respect to development of symptom-based emergency operating procedures (EOPs) was reported. These symptom based EOPs improve the performance of the plant in the event of an incident or accident because they provide a framework within which all critical safety functions can be monitored and appropriate actions taken. They provide a complement to event-based procedures because it isn t possible to anticipate all plant events, particularly combinations of individual events. The Paks NPP staff have integrated the existing event-based procedures with symptom-based EOPs to provide a comprehensive framework to appropriately respond to all abnormal and emergency conditions. 

No one system has proven effective in eliminating all incidents associated with incorrect valve activation due to mistaken coke drum operation (US EPA, 2003). However, the development of a set of permissive logics that prevent inadvertent valve operations during the coke drums batch steps has been an improvement adopted by some refiners. But, once the permissive logics matrix is developed (based on operational procedures), it is important to define what type of accident scenarios these logics can prevent and the availability required for those logics which will need to be defined as safety instrmnented functions. 

Best practice information on safe working practices in the coastal and maritime engineering sector has been assembled through examination of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) statistical data and through detailed discussions with clients, consultants, contractors and suppliers, examining current operational procedures, accident records and perceptions of risk. This document incorporates lessons learnt from previous experience in the coastal and maritime construction sectors, and contains guidance and recommendations for all stakeholders involved in the safety of construction work in the coastal and maritime environment. 

The initial training includes safe work practices, the hazardous materials of the process and safety measures, emergency procedures, operating procedures and job hazard analyses, accidents and near misses, operating limits and actions and the results of deviation, and equipment and process parameters. 

In short, the accident risk assessment provides a comprehensive, detailed evaluation of the overall accident risk associated with the operation and maintenance of a specific facility, including its systems, equipment, and hardware. It incorporates the results of integrated hazard analyses, recommended design changes, hazard reports, and procedural or administrative tools that will eliminate or reduce the risk of these hazards, operational flowcharts, safety-critical procedure lists, and other such information pertinent to overall assessment of accident risk. 

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