Schedule 3 chemicals protective purposes

Within the confines of the CW prohibition regime, that is among states parties to the CWC, transfers of toxic chemicals have to be declared in relation to Schedule 1 chemicals only. According to Part VI such transfers are permissible only for research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes. Individual transfers have to be notified to the OPCW Technical Secretariat 30 days before they are scheduled to take place by both sender and recipient. In addition, [e]ach State Party shall make a detailed annual declaration regarding transfers during the previous year. ... 

The national aggregate of all Schedule 1 chemicals within a State Party may not exceed 1 ton at any given time. Production data must be declared for the following the single small-scale facility (SSSF) with a maximum annual production of up to 1 ton per year per State Party for protective purpose facilities with aggregate production of up to 10 kg per year per State Party and for research, medical, and pharmaceutical facilities with an aggregate... 

A State Party shall not produce, acquire, retain, transfer or use Schedule 1 chemicals unless (a) The chemicals are applied to research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes and... 

A State Party may transfer Schedule 1 chemicals outside its territory only to another State Party and only for research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes in accordance with paragraph 2. 

Each State Party that produces Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes shall carry out the production at a single small-scale facility approved by the State Party, except as set forth in paragraphs 10,11 and 12. 

Production of Schedule 1 chemicals in aggregate quantities not exceeding 10 kg peryear may be carried out for protective purposes at one facility outside a single small-scale facility. This facility shall be approved by the State Party. 

Synthesis of Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical or pharmaceutical purposes, but not for protective purposes, may be carried out at laboratories in aggregate quantities less than 100 g per year per facility. These facilities shall not be subject to any obligation relating to declaration and verification as specified in Sections D and E. 

For each facility, a State Party shall provide the Technical Secretariat with the name, location and a detailed technical description of the facility or its relevant part(s) as requested by the Technical Secretariat. The facility producing Schedule 1 chemicals for protective purposes shall be specifically identified. For existing facilities, this initial declaration shall be provided not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for the State Party. Initial declarations on new facilities shall be provided not less than 180 days before operations are to begin. 

Recognising further that the production limits specified in Part VI of the Verification Annex, when applied to Schedule 1 chemicals that are produced and consumed without being isolated, might in the future have a negative impact on production of such chemicals for research, medical, pharmaceutical, or protective purposes by limiting the quantities that can be produced and held for purposes not prohibited under the Convention ... 

The acquisition, retention, in-country-transfer, import, export and the use of Schedule 1 chemicals are prohibited unless the chemicals are exclusively applied to research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes and the types and quantities of chemicals are strictly limited to those which can be justified for such purposes. These activities are subject to prior declaration in accordance with regulations established under this [Act, Statute, Ordinance, etc.]. ... 

The Second Review Conference recognised the decrease in the number of remaining Chemical Weapons storage facilities but reiterated the conclusion of the First Review Conference on the importance of possessor States Parties implementing appropriate measures to secure such storage facilities and to prevent movement of their chemical weapons out of the facilities, with the exception of removal for destruction or (in accordance with the provisions of the Convention) withdrawal of Schedule I chemicals for use for research, medical, pharmaceutical, or protective purposes. 

The verification provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention are not nearly as extensive as those employed by UNSCOM. The CWC inspectors will lack the access rights, the freedom of movement, and the surveillance opportunities enjoyed by UNSCOM. They will have to implement two systems of verification, involving routine and challenge inspections. Under the routine system, inspectors will be required to validate the declarations of participating states to the OPCW on topics specified in the treaty. This will include initial information on the size and composition of existing stockpiles, storage facilities, and any production facilities the actual destruction of those stockpiles and production facilities (or the conversion of the latter for purposes not prohibited under the Convention) the non-diversion of chemicals made in civilian facilities for military purposes and the operation of the single, small-scale facility pennitted to each state party for the production of Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical, protective and other purposes. 

The need to produce a chemical listed in Schedule 1 can only be justified by its use for any of the following purposes research, medical, pharmaceutical, or protective. This criterion is further linked to another restriction, which requires that the type and quantities are appropriate for the declared purpose. 

While not explicitly mentioned in the Convention the requirement to physically protect Schedule 1 chemicals aims at implementing the obligation of Article VI(2) of the Convention to ensure that activities relating to toxic chemicals and their precursors be carried out for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. 

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