Safeguards distance

Mitigation measures can also be passive safeguards, meaning that they require no human intervention and no engineered sensing and actuation system to work. Examples of passive mitigation measures are secondary containment systems, blast-resistant and fire-resistant structures, insulated or low-heat-capacity spill surfaces to reduce the rate of evaporation, and an increased distance between the hazardous materials and energies and the sensitive receptors. 

One way the air could leak is in the event of a power failure where a valve does not close all the way. One safeguard is to have a generator that would turn on in the instance of a power failure. This generator would then turn on the strategically placed ignition/elements and heat up between I200°F and 1300°F. This would cause the air to react moderately if a leak were to occur. The heated elements will have to be placed a certain specific distance from the air leak to have any positive affect. More studies are necessary to find the distance between the air leak and the element wire where the air can still be controlled to react safely. 

A hazard analysis may be performed to review reductions in the suggested separation distances. Increased risk can be mitigated by providing additional safeguards, such as fireproofing, automatic water-spray systems, emergency shutdown systems, or additional firefighting equipment. 

These conclusions do not contradict a recent analysis as to the cost of safeguarding the world s biodiversity through protected areas, which should be affordable by governments (James 1999). However, the dimensions of foreseeable protected areas are too small (Musters 2000) and separated by too great a distance. Another problem is the conflict between areas of high biodiversity and high density of human population, which often overlap, such as in the Nairobi National Park. 

The activities at Picatinny Arsenal have been separated to comply with safety distances and all known means are employed to safeguard workers. When accidents have occurred, it has been due to these precautions that injuries to employees and loss of material or damage to buildings have been kept to a minimum at Picatinny... 

Indeed, since the 1950s, the US Reactor Safeguards Committee , set up by the Atomic Energy Commission with the task of defining the guidelines for nuclear safety, had indicated that, for a non-contained reactor, an exclusion distance (without resident population) should be provided. This distance, R, had to be equal, at least to that given by Eq. 1.1. 

Extensive work has been performed to establish effective clearances and safety distances in order to protect machine operators and others. Widely accepted safeguarding dimensions are defined by standard ANSI/ASME B15.1. Safety distances are an important consideration in the designation of machine safeguarding. Safety distances are a function of stopping time of machines and the speed at which a machine operator or observer can inadvertently move a body part into a hazard zone. Safety distance considerations are defined in standards and regulations such as OSHA publication 29CFR 1910 and ANSI standard ANSI B11.2... 

Costly method of safeguarding. Requires knowledgeable maintenance and calibration. Safety distance requirement may be excessive for slow-stopping machines. Does not protect others if applied only to operator side of machine. 

A method of safeguarding that protects the operator by requiring the operator to hold the workpiece at a distance from the hazard area such that the operator cannot reach the hazard portion of the machine cycle. 

Safeguards include guards, devices, distance, or location. Safeguards for machines fall into two major groups mechanical power transmission safeguards, and point-of-operation safeguards. 

Safeguards for protection against external radiation involve the use of time, distance, and shielding. 

The Safeguards Conunittee letter acknowledged the complexity of site evaluation. While admitting that a large number of variables had to be considered from site to site, the committee believed it brought a consistent philosophy to site assessment. The letter focused on Commissioner Graham s concern about exclusion distances and population density... 

The draft criteria, presented to the environmental subcommittee in late August 1960 and to the full Safeguards Committee a month later, established three distances for a reactor of any given power level. Beck labeled them "benchmarks"—spedfically, an exclusion distance, an evacuation distance, and a population-center distance. The exclusion area, under the complete control of the reactor owner, had an outer-limit distance at which, following the onset of a maximum credible accident, the total radiation dose received by an individual in two hours... 

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