Reference simpliciter

Let us call the notion of reference used in the first option relative reference , and the notion of reference mentioned in the second option reference simpliciter . Relative reference is a relation between a word within a conceptual scheme to some entity in the quasi-phenomenal world constituted by that scheme. Reference simpliciter is a relation between a word within a conceptual scheme and some entity in the quasi-phenomenal world constituted by the adequate conceptual scheme. Defined in this way, reference simpliciter is also relative reference. It is just a distinguished member of the class of relative reference relations, just as the world simpliciter is just a distinguished member of the class of quasi-phenomenal worlds, and just as an adequate conceptual scheme is just a distinguished member of the class of conceptual schemes. 

So the dilemma is this. We can identify the ordinary notion of reference with two different relations, relative reference and reference simpliciter. If we identify it with relative reference we lose the continuity of discourse. Adopting a new conceptual scheme would amount to changing the subject. Competition would be replaced by different but equal truths . If we identify the ordinary notion of reference with reference simpliciter, we lose the ability to explain changes in linguistic behavior in terms of referential change. What shall we do ... 

But if someone ignores the distinction between relative reference and reference simpliciter, he may be tempted to argue as follows. 

The point may be put more sharply as follows. If we take sense to be whatever fixes reference simpliciter, than the users of Pre did not know the sense of water . What fixes the reference of a word is the justification condition in the adequate scheme. The adequate scheme is Post. They did not have Post, so they did not know the sense of water . Thus even if (1) is granted, the Twin Earth argument still does not work against my account, because (1) cannot be applied to our pre-Daltonian ancestors. 

Some people believe, as Fodor ( Methodological Solipsim ) did, that no explanation of behavior should appeal to anything outside the mind. Reference is a relation to something outside the mind, so it cannot be invoked in the explanation of behavior. If that is right, the notion of relative reference is superfluous. The only work relative reference is allowed to do is to explain behavior in certain cases. If it cannot do even that, we have to get rid of it. Consequently, the ordinary notion of reference should be identified with reference simpliciter without further ado. 

In one sense the logic is compelling. If (i) the game is played only once, (ii) the actors are motivated solely by the payoff in the matrix and (iii) they behave rationally, collective action mMSf fail. By contraposition, we might look into the possibilities for collective action if the interaction is repeated several times if the payoffs that motivate the actors differ from the material reward structure and if the behaviour is less than fully rational. It turns out that under all these conditions, collective action does become possible. The three cases correspond to what was referred to earlier as rationaIity-cum-selfishness rationality simpliciter and irrationality. 

Definitions of being physical normally come in ontological terms, that is in terms of what sort of objects and kinds are physical simpliciter and, sometimes, the physical is defined as the nonmental (Spurrett and Papineau 1999 Papineau 2002, ch. 1.10 Crook and Gillet 2001). Sometimes, philosophers defined the physical via reference to physics (Papineau 1993 Heilman and Thompson 1975, 553 ff.). 

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