Quasi-phenomenal

Let us call the notion of reference used in the first option relative reference , and the notion of reference mentioned in the second option reference simpliciter . Relative reference is a relation between a word within a conceptual scheme to some entity in the quasi-phenomenal world constituted by that scheme. Reference simpliciter is a relation between a word within a conceptual scheme and some entity in the quasi-phenomenal world constituted by the adequate conceptual scheme. Defined in this way, reference simpliciter is also relative reference. It is just a distinguished member of the class of relative reference relations, just as the world simpliciter is just a distinguished member of the class of quasi-phenomenal worlds, and just as an adequate conceptual scheme is just a distinguished member of the class of conceptual schemes. 

Even though this will be dealt with in more detail later, it is important to get clear about the nature of the ontological mind-dependence of the quasi-phenomenal world. It means only the mind-dependence of things, not the mind-dependence of the relations obtaining between them, which was mentioned in clause (3) of the correspondence theory in the previous paragraph. Take the sentence The table is brown . It is true if and only if the table is brown. The object the table refers to must have the property brown refers to. The object and the property are ontologically mind-dependent. But it is ontologically independent of the mind whether that object does actually have that property. 

Malrieux, J. P., A. Pullman, et M. Rossi Etude theorique des densites de spin dans des ions negatifs pouvant presenter des phenomenes de quasi-degeneres-cence. Theoret. Chim. Acta (Berlin) 3, 261 (1965). 

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