Proliferation pyrochemical processes

Some of the pyrochemical processes have more potential for being proliferation resistant because of the great similarity of the chemistry of uranium, plutonium, and some of the fission products in the chosen systems. Ordinary processes are designed to maximize differences in chemical behavior in order to separate constitutents. For some of the pyrochemical processes the chemical equilibria are such that partial separations are possible but complete separations are thermodynamically limited. For example, excess uranium can be separated from plutonium by precipitation in a molten metal such as zinc only until both are present in about equal quantities in solution, but no further ( 3, 4). Likewise, the solubility of fission products is selectively limited. Only a portion of elements such as ruthenium will stay in solution and be removed 05). The majority of the ruthenium precipitates with the actinides. A complete separation is again thermodynamically limited. As a result only a modest dependence needs to be placed on process equipment and facility design for proliferation resistance. 

Zinc Distillation Process ( 3, 4 ). A zinc distillation process was selected as a reference pyrochemical process that would have a sufficient degree of proliferation resistance that it could be used by nonweapons nations to reprocess spent fuel without significantly increasing their weapons production capability. The process has the inherent proliferation-resistant advantages of being a low decontamination process with limited plutonium enrichment in uranium-plutonium-zinc mixtures. The process chemistry flow sheet for this process is shown in Figure 1. 

Pyrochemical processing methods may offer unique advantages over more conventional aqueous methods with respect to meeting nonproliferation goals. Some pyrochemical processes are intrinsically proliferation resistant because the process is incapable of producing a weapons-usable product without significant alterations. The product also can be sufficiently radioactive that it is physically difficult to divert. These features warrant the examination of pyrochemical and dry processing methods under current nonproliferation policies. 

The present work at Rocky Flats is an extension of the Argonne work and is directed to development of a proliferation resistant pyrochemical process for LMFBR fuels. This article describes a conceptual pyrochemical process and preliminary engineering concepts for coprocessing uranium and plutonium in spent LMFBR core-axial blanket and radial blanket fuels using the Salt Transport Process. 

Although the retention of selective fission products in fissile materials may not adversely affect the performance of fuel in a reactor, the intensity of the gamma radiation is such that the fissile material must be handled, transferred, and fabricated remotely. As a result, it is both technically difficult to divert the fissile material and fabricate a weapon, and nearly impossible to do so without detection. The levels of residual radioactivity in the product of some of the pyrochemical or dry processing methods is close to that found in spent unreprocessed fuel and hence the reprocessed product presents a risk to proliferation only trivially less than that of spent fuel. Pyrochemical and dry processing methods can be used that will... 

The pyrochemical coprocessing of spent nuclear fuel by the Salt Transport Process appears to be a potentially viable reprocessing method, not only as an "exportable proliferation resistant technology," but as a domestic reprocessing operation. All operations are nonaqueous and waste generation is in solid form, thus requiring no conversion from aqueous solutions to solids. 

Miles, K. M., Argonne National Laboratory, "The Pyrocivex Processes are Proliferation Resistant Pyrochemical Reprocessing Methods such as the Zinc Distillation or Modified Salt Transport Process," Private Communication, 1979. 

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