Perception misperception

All this discussion of simulation may create a feeling that there is something unreal about a simulation. Yes, there is in one sense. In terms of what is perceived, though, the simulation in our mind is reality. The person you clearly see crouching in the shadows is a perfectly real perception, is your reality at the time you perceive it, even if you later realize that it was a misperception, a poor simulation of a bush in the dark. In this model, the reality we live in is the simulation. 

In a more general sense, we must realize that "misperception" and "what is and is not there" are usually defined in terms of consensus reality. We may hope that our consensus reality has a high degree of accuracy with respect to physical reality, but to assume automatically that it does is to be very parochial. If one person hears a given piece of music as exceptionally beautiful in its melody, and another hears it as quite common, was the first person suffering an illusion, or was he really more perceptive We must be particularly careful in dealing with phenomena from d-ASCs that our consensus reality automatically defines as hallucinatory. Should we have so much faith in the conceptual schemes evolved in our ordinary d-SoC that we automatically dismiss anything that does not fit with them It is bad science to continue to do so. 

Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 1976). 

Interviews are a good means for determining people s a priori perceptions of the functionality envisioned for the product or system. It is useful to assess these a priori perceptions independently of the perceptions that one may subsequently attempt to create. This assessment is important because it can provide an early warning of any natural tendencies of potential stakeholders to perceive things in ways other than intended in the new product or system. If problems are apparent, one may decide to change the presentation or packaging of the product to avoid misperceptions. 

Clearly, knowledge-based functioning in decision depends upon accurate knowledge of costs, probabilities, and the process of optimization. Misperception of costs and values and misperception of prior defect probabihties can lead to incorrect decisions on criterion placement. Decision support for cost and value perceptions is simple in principle, although it is almost never formalized in an inspection task. Support for estimation of the true defective rate for each type of defect is much more difficult because it is based upon the output of the inspector, or of another inspector who is likely to be equally error prone. It is possible to provide such data to the inspector using another inspector who is allowed more time and/or resources for the decision. When these data are provided as feedforward of likely defect types and probabilities (Sheehan and Drury 1971) or as performance feedback (Drury and Addison 1973), dramatic reductions in error are found. 

Often, ironically, our successful efforts to eliminate or reduce accidents contribute to the march toward higher risk. Perception of the risk associated with an activity often decreases over a period of time when no losses occur even though the real risk has not changed at all. This misperception leads to reducing the very factors that are preventing accidents because they are seen as no longer needed and available to trade off with other needs. The result is that risk increases until a major loss occurs. This vicious cycle needs to be broken to prevent accidents. In STAMP terms, the weakening of the safety control structure over time needs to be prevented or detected before the conditions occur that lead to a loss. 

Psychologists at niosh and elsewhere began suggesting that perhaps these incidents were a form of mass psychogenic illness (mpi), also known as mass hysteria. m p i was understood as a pathology of perception, a form of misperception in which workers wrongly attributed their... 

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