Ordnance Department chemical munitions

Eventually, the War Department also began to plan for chemical warfare. The Medical Department was assigned responsibility for chemical defense and the Ordnance Department responsibility for chemical munitions. The Corps of Engineers was designated to provide engineers to employ the new weapons. This diversified arrangement did not last long. 

Fifth, the munitions apparently could not and were not turned over to the Ordnance Department. In a memorandum dated September 16, 1918, from the Director, Chemical Warfare Service, to the Executive Officer, Research Division, Spring Valley, states. 

Not only is there no evidence that the enormous quantities of toxic substances and munitions known to have been there were moved, but these two memoranda seem to indicate that the chemical and explosive munitions were not moved to the Ordnance Department facilities at Aberdeen. 

Development of phosgene bombs started in early 1942 when the CWS asked the Ordnance Department for a series of chemical bombs of approximately the same shape as general purpose bombs. The new munitions were produced in 1943 and sent to Dugway Proving Ground for testing and evaluation. The 1000-pound bomb holding 415 pounds of CG... 

In 1917-18 the Chemical Warfare Service branched out from its research on toxic agents into other fields, one of which was incendiary mixtures. Chemists experimented with incendiary fillings for shells, grenades, and bombs, but did not have time to perfect any of the munitions. In this field CWS overlapped the Ordnance Department s work on incendiaries. In 1920 the War Department set up a line of demarcation between the two services, with the Ordnance Department henceforth to design the munitions and the CWS to provide the filling. ... 

Mr. Allen, who was also the civilian chief of the New York Chemical Procurement District, had suggested that the district advisory committee be designated the Chemical Advisory Committee to the Army and Navy Munitions Board. This suggestion was adopted and from early 1939 until after the close of World War II the committee, whose members were leading representatives of the chemical industry, met monthly in Washington or New York. Liaison officers from the Army and Navy Munitions Board, the Ordnance Department, and the CWS attended the meetings. A representative from the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense and, later, one from the War Production Board, were often in attendance. ... 

The preparation of plans for securing manufacturing plants in industry, which G-4 listed as one of the chief objectives of the CWS under the Munitions Program, was accomplished in 1940 and 1941. Under the Second Supplemental to the 1941 Appropriations Act, approved on 9 September 1940, funds were allotted to the CWS to erect plants for private industry in order to expedite production. The procedure was for the government to build the plants which would be operated under contract with private industry. Both the Ordnance Department and the Chemical Warfare Service followed the practice extensively. The CWS built charcoal and whetlerite plants and plants for the manufacture of impregnite (CC-2) under this program. ... 

At the end of May, Shadle expressed his satisfaction with the chemical offensive potential and ammunition status in the North African theater. His view seems to have been overly optimistic since smoke pots, tear gas, and HC smoke grenades were the only ammunition items available in sufficient supply. All the chemical supply officers reported urgent requests for unavailable white phosphorus grenades. The Twelfth Air Force reported limited quantities of ANM50A1 4-pound incendiary bombs, a few Mja yoo-pound incendiary bomb clusters, and a considerable number of My4 loo-pound incendiary bomb clusters. There was no other chemical ammunition in the theater although the New York port had promised that 120 days supply of high explosive and smoke shell was en route for the three chemical mortar battalions which had recently arrived in the theater. Aside from a small amount of artillery shell stored by Ordnance, no toxics were available in the theater and none was scheduled to arrive until the fall of 1943. The March theater plan for gas warfare, the first such plan, was based on meeting possible enemy gas attack with this plainly inadequate supply of artillery shell. The new War Department policy for retaliation in event of enemy initiation of gas warfare called for the use of aerial munitions as the principal gas weapons. Shadle s satisfaction with the toxic supply status can be explained by the fact that he did not con-... 

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