On a Plant with Water Cooling

Weinberg, Young, Christy, Plass, Wigner, and Williamson 

Two weeks ago today Dr. Compton requested us to make as detailed plans for a 100,000 kW plant as we can do within two weeks, and the present note is a summary of our work. We were hoping, at the time we received this request, that we shall have the help of a construction engineer in some phases of our work. It is very likely that it will be evident from several of the constructional details which we present that we had no such help. 

The present report contains a discussion of not one, but at least three, possibilities. On the basis of the present information and with the present knowledge of the purpose of the plant, we were unable to decide among three alternatives. The main alternative is whether or not it should be possible to exchange the uranium rods without dismantling the whole plant. Such an exchange would be. 

Both other alternatives have removable uranium pipes that differ by the arrangement at the bottom of the pile. In the first case the pipes stick at the bottom through a stuffing box into a water tank, and one relies essentially on these stuffing boxes for preventing the escape of water vapor into the pile. In the second alternative, the lower connection of the pipes is more elaborate and is made and released by the personnel operating the pUe. In this case it is necessary to put a shield below the pile in order to protect the operating personnel below the pile. This shield causes the main difference between these two alternatives. There is a shield above the pile in both cases. 

The sketches and the general description of the erection of the pile were done by Mr. Young. Most of the calculations concerning the neutron reproduction factor were done by Mr. Weinberg, with the help of Messrs. Plass and Williamson. We drew also on the help of many other members of the group, and we had interesting discussions with Messrs. Creutz, Szilard, as well as with several members of Dr. Burton s group. 

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S = Safety what are the consequences of failure If they are serious, a more resistant material than usual may be justified. For example, on a plant where leaking v. ater would react violently with process materials, the water lines were made from a grade of steel resistant to stress corrosion cracking (from the chloride in the cooling water) as well as rust. 

One of the most notorious cases of industrial disaster took place in 1984 in Bhopal, India. A plant with a license from the Union Carbide company was making methyl isocyanate (MIC), CH3NCO, which is an intermediate for the manufacture of pesticides. MIC boils at 39 °C, and the vapor density is heavier than air and very toxic by inhalation and skin absorption. The maximum allowable air concentration is 0.02 ppm by volume over 8 h. MIC also reacts with water and produces heat, which must be removed to prevent boiling over. On that day in 1984, the cooling system failed during... 

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