Incentives absence

In the absence of more decisive action by EPA, significant near-term reductions in pesticide dietary risks are attainable, but only if farmers are provided support and incentives to change pest management systems, and only if consumers demand change. 

An informative set of calculations was carried out by Brandt et al, coupled to experimental studies that demonstrated first-order dependence of the turnover rate on both catalyst and H2, and zero-order dependence on alkene (a-methyl-(E)-stilbene) concentration [71]. The incentive for this investigation was the absence of any characterized advanced intermediates on the catalytic pathway. As a result of the computation, a catalytic cycle (for ethene) was proposed in which H2 addition to iridium was followed by alkene coordination and migratory insertion. The critical difference in this study was the proposal that a second molecule of H2 is involved that facilitates formation of the Ir alkylhydride intermediate. In addition, the reductive elimination of R-H and re-addition of H2 are concerted. This postulate was subsequently challenged. For hydrogenation of styrene by the standard Pfaltz catalyst, ES-MS analysis of the intermediates formed at different stages in the catalytic cycle revealed only Ir(I) and Ir(III) species, supporting a cycle (at least under low-pressure conditions in the gas... 

By contrast, the absence of such a rule also could dampen the incentive for later generic apphcants to develop ehgihle AND As containing paragraph IV certifications. 

Much of the research pursued by the authors of this paper and by their associates has involved studies of the catalytic hydrogenation of coals in the absence of solvent. The technique has been used to elucidate the mechanisms of catalytic coal liquefaction and to provide simultaneously some insight into the structure of coals. Peter Given was directly instrumental in providing the incentive for this research which has extended since 1983. Previous findings were disseminated through several publications (4-8. In this paper, some of the earlier data have been collated with more recent results (9) to provide an account of the relevance of these studies to the two-component concept. 

As we have already documented, a major market failure is the absence of incentives to develop some drugs that potentially have important social benefits, but that are not currently being developed, in large part because pharmaceutical manufacturers lack an adequate incentive to engage in R D to develop such socially beneficial products. Several types of vaccines are a case in point. Clearly the patent system has proven to be inadequate in providing a sufficient incentive. Perhaps other incentive plans can either replace or supplement existing incentives to correct this market failure. 

Taken as a sufficient condition, Feinberg s (1970) test is open to a similar objection. If I tried harder, 1 would resist. Perhaps the presence of a counterincentive would enable me to try harder than I could in its absence. If my capacity to try were in some way impaired in certain contexts of temptation, my susceptibility to deterrent incentives under certain circumstances would not show that the desire is under my control (here and now). There is some plausibility to the idea that addictions tend to have this effect 1 return to this point later. 

The crucial question then is when does the incentive effect become operative and since the incentive effect is driven by future restraint, the answer is, only if there is some future period where sophisticates will refrain when unhooked in the absence of the incentive effect.1 It is this intuition that drives the different results in propositions 1 and 2 (and that we build on in our discussion of nonstationary preferences and variable myopia). In the stationary model, if in period 1 people would hit when unhooked in the face of pure pessimism, then in all periods they would hit when unhooked in the face of pure pessimism, and therefore the incentive effect cannot be operative. This means that whenever sophis-... 

The economic incentive to minimize fuel consumption on an offshore production platfom is, of course, influenced by the presence or absence of a market for gas, or other needs for gas, either initially or at some future date. In addition to the reduction or design fuel consumption to economically conserve resources, it may be economically worthwhile to consider designs which would consume less fuel at reduced producing loads. Many separation and compression systems consume fuel at essentially level rates, even at loads muck lower than design. 

But if pharmaceutical companies focused exclusively on these major diseases, millions of people with very serious but less widespread conditions would be left without help or hope. The solution, of course, is for the government to provide incentives that supplement the potential sales value of an important treatment for a relatively obscure disease, thus encouraging development in the absence of market blockbuster potential. In the United States, the mechanism for that encouragement is orphan-drug designation. 

In some respects, optimization procedures in flame AES are simpler than those in either AAS or AFS. This is so because of the absence of a light source (apart from the flame atomizer). Moreover, there is little incentive to employ hydrogen as a fuel in flame AES, because the lower flame temperatures (compared to the corresponding acetylene flames) do not favour intense thermally excited atomic emission. Air-acetylene and nitrous oxide-acetylene flames are most widely... 

More efficient technology is not a significant driver of capital cycles in the absence of policy or market incentives. 

Arguing that the final goal was the eradication of small pox, a scheme was devised whereby each visitor was rewarded according to the absence of smallpox in their area. However, although the visitors consistently earned good bonuses, smallpox remained endemic. When considered from the visitors perspective the reasons for this apparently paradoxical situation becomes clear. If you are rewarded for the lack of cases, the incentive is to turn a blind eye. When in doubt don t report. The system is obviously open to abuse. 

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