Gas warfare policy

Waitt AH. Chief, Chemical Corps, to Director of Plans and Operations, General Staff, US Army. Gas Warfare Policy. Washington, DC Chemical Corps. 2 May 1949. Memorandum. 

The United States and Great Britain, by the declaratory statements of Roosevelt and Churchill, had enunciated similar deterrent policies. Thereafter they moved quickly to ensure some co-ordination between these parallel policies. The Combined Chiefs of Staff proved the natural centre of liaison, advised by an ad hoc chemical warfare subcommittee headed by the Chief of the American CWS. The subcommittee duly proposed that gas warfare could be undertaken by the US and British Commonwealth forces on the order of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, if approved by the British and American governments, or independently by either force in the case of retaliation. It recommended, too, that the Combined Chiefs should be informed whenever the enemy had used poison gas or if independent retaliation had been authorised. On 14 November 1942, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the report. ... 

In the Far Eastern theatre, the first use of gas warfare was never seriously considered by the dominant Allied power - the United States. Until 1945 American gas policy has been aptly described as one of minimum deterrence, aimed at inhibiting initiation by the Axis nations. This limited objective reflected Roosevelt s fierce opposition to gas warfare and his declaration that America would never employ it initially. It also derived from a reluctance by the military to divert scarce resources to improve their gas readiness in the Far East. By January 1945, the United States possessed sufficient munitions to launch a gas attack but the bulk of them remained in the United States. Neither of the Pacific Theatre Commanders had allocated the requisite shipping space to transport the gas munitions overseas. In the Pacific Ocean Area, Admiral Chester Nimitz retained only about 5 per cent of the authorised stocks while in the Southwest Pacific Area General... 

A Summary of Important Notes and Papers in connection with the Policy of gas warfare in order of dates from 1899 and Second Report of the Secretary of the Chemical Warfare Committee , 31 March 1922, p. 7, PRO, WO 188/212 and WO 33/1014. 

Policy and strategy were in the making. The Allied leaders decided at the January Casablanca Conference to revive the build-up in the United Kingdom and took a number of actions during 1943 to flesh out that decision. In November 1942 the Combined Chiefs of Staff had briefly turned their attention to gas warfare and now an Allied as well as a United States policy was emerging. This policy required (i) a co-operative American and British effort aimed at arranging the defensive preparedness of all United Nations troops and (2) the accumulation of sufficient toxic munitions to make immediate retaliation possible should the enemy initiate gas warfare anywhere in the world. ... 

At the end of May, Shadle expressed his satisfaction with the chemical offensive potential and ammunition status in the North African theater. His view seems to have been overly optimistic since smoke pots, tear gas, and HC smoke grenades were the only ammunition items available in sufficient supply. All the chemical supply officers reported urgent requests for unavailable white phosphorus grenades. The Twelfth Air Force reported limited quantities of ANM50A1 4-pound incendiary bombs, a few Mja yoo-pound incendiary bomb clusters, and a considerable number of My4 loo-pound incendiary bomb clusters. There was no other chemical ammunition in the theater although the New York port had promised that 120 days supply of high explosive and smoke shell was en route for the three chemical mortar battalions which had recently arrived in the theater. Aside from a small amount of artillery shell stored by Ordnance, no toxics were available in the theater and none was scheduled to arrive until the fall of 1943. The March theater plan for gas warfare, the first such plan, was based on meeting possible enemy gas attack with this plainly inadequate supply of artillery shell. The new War Department policy for retaliation in event of enemy initiation of gas warfare called for the use of aerial munitions as the principal gas weapons. Shadle s satisfaction with the toxic supply status can be explained by the fact that he did not con-... 

By the end of February 1944 Marriott was thoroughly disgusted with the detailed supply operation which had been the lot of the Sixth Army Chemical Section. He wrote to Copthorne that he had come to the conclusion that "we were sweeping water up hill. Considering the small quantity of chemical supply, he believed that Ordnance would feel no additional strain on handling chemical ammunition, and he felt that Ordnance would not need a separate system as did the CWS. He wanted more time to devote to tactical policy and gas warfare protection and he felt he could get the time only by disposing of a part of his supply burden. ... 

Announcement of the creation of the Chemical Warfare Service in 1920 as a branch of the permanent Military Establishment presumably settled an issue that had been discussed heatedly and at length. Actually, debate over functions of the CWS was to continue for many years. This perennial controversy had its roots in two spheres. One was the policy of the United States on gas warfare. The other was the reaction within the War Department itself to gas warfare. 

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