Formal safety assessments elements

All three elements must be linked to one another. For example, the facility description will provide technical information that provides the basis of the formal safety assessment and the safety management system. Similarly, the safety management system will define what information should be included in the facility description. 

A more policy-oriented issue is that many applications do not follow the suggested definitions by relevant authorities. In the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), which is commonly seen as the official guide for risk assessment in the maritime field, risk is defined as the combination of the frequency and the severity of the consequence (IMO 2007), i.e. a categorization in line with class C6. While the definitions based on expected values (Cl) are close to this view as it consists of the same elements, the definitions in line with C2 and especially C5 represent significantly different risk classes. The ISO-def-inition, seeing risk as the effect of uncertainty on objectives , is not applied in the application area. 

In 1985, Uie Cimadian Chemical Producers Association (CCPA) released a pampWet entitled, "Essential Components of Safety Assessment Systems . Modifications to process or plant was one of the topics discussed in Uiis pamplilet. CCPA recommended a 12 element program (listed below) to formally e.xamine and approve process conditions whellier permanent or temporary prior to implementation. 

If the type of scheme is unlike anything introduced before, it may be better to carry out a Road Safety Assessment rather than a Road Safety Audit. The Road Safety Assessment can be written less formally than a Road Safety Audit and can include a Risk Assessment of any elements of the scheme that may give cause for concern. 

Risk assessment procedures in health and safety are legal requirements in most countries and also essential elements of the safety management systems, being they certified or not. In formal risk assessments, the risks are fisted based on their priority in terms of severity and likelihood of the possible accident. In spite of the fact that there is a subjective element involved in such estimation, the process will yield a rational basis for decisions to act on hazards encountered. Further, the follow-up assessments are giving estimates of residual risks for those risks counteracted, to complete the prevention with additional measures where needed. 

Figure 2.69 shows the basic elements of a safety case and the relationship between these elements. The safety case should consist of a structured argument supported by a body of evidence. The quantity and quality of the evidence depends on the systems risks, complexity, and the familiarity of the circumstances involved. It should be noted that in many safety assessments, the safety case argument is often neglected or stated very weakly, thus the intent of this formal approach is to avoid that situation. 

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