Evaluation serious injury prevention

In Chapter 3, Serious Injury Prevention, an outline for such a study was presented under the heading Proposing a Study of Serious Injuries. Such a study will not be time-consuming since the data to be collected and analyzed should already exist or can be obtained easily. To assist in such a study, two addenda are provided at the conclusion of this chapter. Both are reprinted Ifom the third edition of On The Practice Of Safety Addendum A, A Systemic Causation Model for Hazards-Related Incidents, and Addendum B, Reference for Causal Factors and Corrective Actions. Another good reference when completing this evaluation, in terms of its comments on human errors that may be made above the worker level, is Chapter 4 here. 

Another way to evaluate risks is to calculate the sensitivity of the total risk estimates to changes in assumptions, frequencies, or consequences. Risk analysts tend to be conservative in their assumptions and calculations, and the cumulative effect of this conservatism may be a substantial overestimation of risk. For example, always assuming that short-term exposure to chemical concentrations above some threshold limit value will cause serious injury may severely skew the calculated risks of health effects. If you do not understand the sensitivity of the risk results to this conservative assumption, you may misallocate your loss prevention resources or misinform your company or the public about the actual risk. 

Under the Five Star approach, reporting, investigating, and addressing near misses provides opportunities to evaluate the unsafe acts and unsafe conditions that can lead to losses before they actually occur. In 2010, the PWSD reported 10 serious injuries. This correlates to more than 6,000 near misses or missed opportunities to correct the unsafe act or condition and prevent the injuries. 

Established procedures for evaluating causes of incidents should be in place at all companies and organizations. Incident analysis should be followed by the implementation of controls to prevent future similar occurrences. Comprehensive procedures should also include the analysis of near incidents. Potential causes can be controlled before an incident occurs. All incidents that result in fatalities or serious injuries to more than one person should have the analysis conducted under the direction of corporate safety and with legal advice. 

Placing too much emphasis on injury-producing events but not focusing on potentially serious close call incidents can result in unreliable effective assessments. Rather than relying solely on injury rates or other postevent assessments, organizations could use a broader hazard control audit process. This management style audit would address several key components of the accident prevention process. The audit forms would help evaluators rate each component against prepublished... 

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