Chemical Weapons Convention measures

See, e.g., Republic of Bulgaria, National Measures for Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, RC-l/NAT.ll, 28 April 2003 The People s Republic of China, Report on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in China, RC-1/ NAT.2, 15 April 2003 The Republic of Cuba, Methods Adopted by the Republic of Cuba to Ensure Compliance with the Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention, RC-1/NAT.4, 5 May 2003 The Kingdom of Sweden, National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, RC-1/NAT.27, 8 May 2003 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, National Implementation of the Cherrtical Weapons Convention, RC-1/NAT.3, 15 April 2003 United States Delegation, CWC Review Conference National Implementation Measures, 3 March 2003 (on file with the author). 

As of February 2005, there are 134 States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In addition, many of the States Parties, which entered reservations, have lifted those reservations as they are incompatible with the obligations under the later Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, there have been successive UnitedNations General Assembly resolutions on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, such as that adopted in October 2004 which include language that ... 

As already noted, a central provision of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the general purpose criterion which prohibits Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as types and quantities are consistent with such purposes . The implementation of this general purpose criterion is placed by Article VI on each State Party which shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used within its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control for purposes not prohibited under this Convention . 

Chemical weapons are totally prohibited under the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The General Purpose Criterion ensures that all toxic chemicals, past, present and future, are prohibited unless they are for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. The regime against chemical weapons will become more effective as the Chemical Weapons Convention approaches universality and international initiatives in regard to toxic chemicals become more widely applied throughout the world. National measures to ensure that toxic chemicals do not present a risk to health and safety can and should be harnessed to ensure effective implementation of the obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention to ensure that such chemicals are only used for purposes permitted under the Convention. 

The most recent control measure is the Chemical Weapons Convention which came into effect in 1997. Most countries have signed and ratified it, notable exceptions being Egypt, Iraq, North Korea, Sudan, Syria and Taiwan. 

The United States has been active in its participation in international efforts to specifically control the spread of biological and chemical weapons. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction (also known as the Biological Weapons Convention) and the Chemical Weapons Convention have been discussed in detail in other publications,4 5 as have various confidence-building measures,5 which have met with limited success. 

Heteronuclear correlation experiments can be useful in terms of identification and quantification of traces in complex mixtures such as soil or water. The detection of trace amounts of organophosphorus compounds related to the chemical weapons convention impressively demonstrates how the advantages of each nucleus were combined, namely the sensitivity of the H NMR spectra and the freedom from background noise for P NMR spectra [26]. This was achieved by measuring inverse H- P NMR spectra utilizing the HSQC experiments. These techniques will be introduced to drug analysis in body fluids. 

Tabassi L, Dhavle A (2014) Article VII national implementation measures. In Krutzsch W, Myjer E, Trapp R (eds) The Chemical Weapons Convention—a commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p 195... 

Export controls could even prove counter productive in the longer term. Western governments rarely described them as a panacea most depicted them as an interim measure, pending the negotiation of a Chemical Weapons Convention. Thereafter, the United States characterised them as a sovereign right which could still be imposed to promote national... 

Recalling that Part Vlll, paragraph 26, of the Verification Annex to the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter the Verification Aimex ) prescribes the necessary measures, regarding transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to States not Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter the Convention ), inter alia the requirement of an end-use certificate from the recipient State ... 

Bearing in mind that, in paragraph 7.73 of its report (RC-1/5, dated 9 May 2003), the First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention concluded that all States Parties should take the necessary measures to ensure full implementation of the Convention s requirement for end-use eertifieation by recipient States not Party, and requested the Executive Council to submit a recommendation on this matter to the Conference at its Tenth Session ... 

Recommends that the Second Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention review the implementation of measures regarding transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to States not Party as stipulated in Part... 

MEASURES TO UPHOLD THE AUTHORITY OF THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL AND TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION... 

Vesicant agents (sulfur mustards, nitrogen mustards, and lewisites) and nerve agents (tabun, sarin, soman, and VX, among others) are included in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 1 of chemicals for the application of verification measures (http //www. opcw.org, accessed February 21, 2014). This schedule features chemicals that have little or no use in the industry and have been developed, produced, stockpiled, or used as CWs. 

The aim of the Western countries was, and remains, to achieve a convention that provides for a thorough and effective machinery of verification , The difficulty lies in defining what would constitute a thorough and effective machinery . It is something of a cliche to state that it is not possible to achieve total certainty in the verification of a chemical weapons convention. But what degree of risk is acceptable and how can it be measured There is some evidence to suggest that for senior military officers in NATO countries, the acceptable level of risk may be very small. ... 

Nevertheless, it was events in Kurdistan in particular which fully illustrated both the ambiguity of what was banned and the absence of verification measures under the Geneva Protocol. Only use of chemical weapons was banned, not possession. In 1972 the United Nations General Assembly had adopted the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Biological Weapons. Chemical weapons fell outside this convention and by 1988 it became clear that a chemical weapons treaty was urgently needed to place effective constraints on the proliferation of these weapons worldwide. 

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