Chemical Warfare Center

Haber was slow to grasp the implications of the Nazis rise to power. As Germans boycotted Jewish businesses and Hitler s brownshirts removed Jewish students from university libraries and laboratories, the Nazis passed a law on April 7, 1933, to cleanse the civil service and universities of Jews. By this time, Haber s Kaiser Wilhelm Institute was financed by the government and its employees were treated as civil functionaries subject to the new law. Haber himself was exempt because of war work and seniority. Eager for a chemical warfare center, Nazi authorities singled out Haber s institute and ordered him to fire its Jews. At the same time, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society told Haber to somehow keep his important senior scientists. He had until May 2 to act. 

May 1942 Name changed from Edgewood Arsenal to Chemical Warfare Center... 

Aug 1946 Name changed from Chemical Warfare Center to Army Chemical Center... 

Brig. Gen. Ray I.. Avery, Commanding General, Chemical Warfare Center, Edgewood Arsenal, Md., 1 42— 6. 

The duties of the commanding general of the Chemical Warfare Center corresponded closely to those of a post commander. They included per-soiuiel administration, internal security, public relations, post inspection, and post engineer functions for all elements of the center. The centralization of administration for those activities invariably made for a greater degree of efficiency. For example, it was far more effective to have one central office administer personnel functions than to have a half dozen independent offices scattered over the post, as was formerly the practice. ... 

The Chemical Warfare Center included an Arsenal Operations Department which supervised strictly arsenal activities. As the new arsenals at Huntsville and Pine Bluff and later at Rocky Mountain got into operation, the nature of arsenal activities at Edgewood changed. These new arsenals took over the bulk of the arsenal operations in the CWS, and the Edgewood plants eventually assumed the role of pilot plants, in addition to handling a number of "blitz jobs. 

The administration of the Eastern, Gulf, and Midwest Depots had one characteristic in common in each case housekeeping functions were performed by an adjoining installation. In the case of the Eastern Depot the Chemical Warfare Center took care of those functions, while the Gulf and Midwest housekeeping functions were handled by Huntsville and Pine Bluff Arsenals respectively. In contrast to those three depots the other three —Deseret, Northeast, and Indianapolis—were responsible for their own housekeeping activities. In the CWS sections of general depots the Quartermaster Corps had responsibility. 

Maintains liaison with Transportation Corps Division of Chemical Warfare Center of Edgewood Ancnal, Md... 

When the Incendiary Branch of the Chief s office was inactivated in June 1942, supervision of the Columbia CWS laboratory was turned over to the Technical Division, OC CWS. The scope of the laboratory s activities was broadened to include development work not only on the incendiary bomb but also on other items such as the 4.2-inch chemical mortar and the flame thrower. On 31 December 1943 the CWS-Columbia University contract was terminated and the laboratory s functions transferred to the Chemical Warfare Center. 

Thanks to the Selective Service system, the CWS secured a number of unusually well-qualified enlisted men. In June 1941, for example, there were thirty-two enlisted men with college degrees in the ist Laboratory Company. Of these, seven had doctor s degrees and three had master s degrees. After activation of the Officer Candidate School, men of this caliber had opportunity to apply for admission. Many of the men assigned to the installations were very well qualified for minor administrative and clerical posts. The Chemical Warfare Center, particularly, utilized their... 

The centralization of personnel functions at the Chemical Warfare Center has already been referred to. Huntsville Arsenal also experienced the need for a centralized personnel organization, for at that installation, where all activities were highly decentralized, personnel fimctions were no exception to the rule. Each operating division at the arsenal had its Own personnel officers who were invariably officers of company grade subject to the command of the respective division chiefs. Although there was a personnel division at headquarters, it was lacking in effective authority. 

There was no standard organization for administering personnel activities in the depots. Certain depots had no personnel units. The personnel activities of the Gulf Depot, for example, were administered by Huntsville Arsenal. The Eastern Depot had a personnel division until September 1942, when its functions were taken over by the personnel division of the Chemical Warfare Center. The other CWS depots each had personnel units. 

The on-and-off-the-job problems of employees in the CWS were confined almost exclusively to the Chemical Warfare Center and the arsenals. Difficulties arose on such matters as housing, transportation, care of the children of working mothers, adequate eating accommodations, and recreation. The failure to solve these problems was a contributory factor to the comparatively high rates of absenteeism and turnover at certain CWS arsenals during the war. To reduce the rates of absenteeism and turnover, employee relations officers were appointed at the various installations in 1943. 

The Training Aids Section remained an operating agency of the Office of the Chief located at the Chemical Warfare Center until June 1943 when, with its equipment and staff, it became a division of the Chemical Warfare... 

The Chemical Warfare Center was officially activated in May 1942 to facilitate management of the diversity of wartime activities centering at Edgewood Arsenal. See above, Chapter VI. 

A small percentage of the officer candidates were Negroes. The records of these men were in no way distinguishable from those of white students. The Chemical Warfare Center made no distinction between candidates on the basis of race with no segregation whatever in the dormitories or the mess halls. White and Negro students, of course, sat in the same classes. ... 

The high rate of failures experienced late in 1942 and early in 1943 began to fall off in the latter year, after which a generally downward trend was followed until the end of the war. In the thirty-six OCS classes conducted at the Chemical Warfare Center prior to the cessation of hostilities, a total of 8,068 candidates were enrolled. Of these, 1,660 were relieved from the school before graduation. Academic failures accounted for 696 dismissals. Resignations, unclassified as to cause, totaled 415. Leadership deficiencies were directly responsible for 352 separations. Other causes were miscellaneous (including physical defects), 144 conduct, 53. Of all OCS... 

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