Chemical stockpiles, deterrent

To serve as an effective retaliatory deterrent, a chemical stockpile must be able to threaten the vital elements in an enemy s force structure. These include front-line, second and third echelon troops command, control and communications centres airfields logistics facilities and transportation nodes. The deterrent should be flexible, enabling commanders to choose from an array of retaliatory options. It should facilitate chemical strikes with the agent and weapon systems which are appropriate to particular targets and accord with the mission... 

In the fall of 1968, the Department of the Army directed the disposal of certain chemical munitions which were obsolete and excess to the National deterrent stockpile. The proposed-disposal plan, designated Operation Chase, provided for these munitions to be transported across country (Denver, Colorado, to the East Coast), be loaded on excess freighter type boats and taken under US Coast Guard escort to a previously designated explosives dumping site beyond the Atlantic Continental Shelf and sunk. 

In this context, one needs to recall the objectives of the multilateral verification system. Traditionally, two aspects were emphasized confidence-building and deterrence of treaty violation. In the CWC case, confidence-building relates to the confirmation (a) that the declared CW stockpiles and production capabilities are actually being destroyed, and (b) that chemical activities in those facilities inspected under Article VI are legitimate. The deterrence effect of the CWC verification system relies essentially on two interconnected factors the probability that an Article VI inspection can actually detect a violation (and, relatedly, that the inspection system is optimized in such a way that it induces compliance and maximizes the selection of relevant facilities ), and the confidence of States Parties in the OPCW s ability to conduct an effective and conclusive challenge inspection should it be requested to do so. 

Chemical and biological proliferation accelerated rapidly during the course of the Second World War (until vast stockpiles of unused agents and chemical munitions were accumulated), but the process ebbed almost as quickly as it had erupted. This recession almost certainly reflected the defeat and occupation of many possessor states - not merely the Axis powers, but also many of the European chemical states other than Britain, the Soviet Union and some of the wartime neutrals. It also underscored that major wars could be fought and won without recourse to chemical and biological weapons, and that nuclear weapons had become the indisputably dominant form of strategic bombardment. Deterrence, based on the threat of retaliation-in-kind, had moved beyond a projected response to a particular form of warfare, since the nuclear threat deterred... 

The Alliance as a whole does not, and under the binary plan still would not, possess any offensive lethal chemical capability. Chemical weapons deployed by the US are not declared to NATO and remain under US national control. While the modernised stockpile might have improved the prospects of deterring Soviet attacks on US sectors of the front (although that, as we shall see, is debatable), it would be rash to assume that the deterrent effect applied equally to other Allied sectors unless there was a clear perception that the... 

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