AWACS

Threats of aggression can come in all shapes and sizes, so defenses have to be versatile. The largest-scale threat is war between nations. Rulers of nations always seem to be wanting the resources of neighboring countries, so threatened countries have to defend themselves or suffer unpleasant consequences. In modern times, countries can have very sophisticated means of defense indeed. The United States has stockpiled atomic bombs if some other country shakes its proverbial fist at us, we can rattle our bombs at them. If threats escalate to violence and we don t wish to use atomic bombs for one reason or another, then other machines can be deployed jets that drop smart bombs, AWACS planes that monitor the air space for many miles, tanks equipped for night combat, surface-to-air-missiles that shoot down surface-to-surface missiles, and much more. To the techno-war-monger, we live in a golden age. 

AU the aircraft involved were flying in clear weather with excellent visibility, an AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft was providing surveillance and control for the aircraft in the area, and all the aircraft were equipped with electronic identification and communication equipment (apparently working properly) and flown by decorated and highly experienced pilots. 

ACE Airborne Command Element (the commander s representative in the AWACS)... 

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System (a military air traffic control system in the sky)... 

The Combined Forces Air Component (CFAC) was tasked with exercising tactical control of all OPC aircraft operating in the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) and operational control over Air Force aircraft. The CFAC commander exercised daily control of the OPC flight mission through a Director of Operations (CFAC/DO), as well as a ground-based Mission Director at the Combined Task Force (CTF) headquarters in Incirlik and an Airborne Command Element (ACE) aboard the AWACS. 

AWACS), U.S. Air Force (USAF) airlift, and the fighter forces. He had tactical control of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, Thrkish, French, and British fixed wing and helicopter aircraft. The splintering of control between the CFAC and MCC commanders, along with communication problems between them, were major contributors to the accident. 

The Airborne Command Element (ACE) flies in the AWACS and is the commander s representative in the air, armed with up-to-the-minute situational information to make time-critical decisions. The ACE monitors all air operations and is in direct contact with the Mission Director located in the ground command post. He must also interact with the AWACS crew to identify reported unidentified aircraft. 

The ROE in place at the time of the shootdown stated that aircrews experiencing unusual circumstances were to pass details to the ACE or AWACS, who would provide guidance on the appropriate response [200]. Exceptions were possible, of course, in cases of imminent threat. Aircrews were directed to first contact the ACE and, if that individual was unavailable, to then contact the AWACS. The six unusual drcumstances/occurrences to be reported, as defined in the ROE, included any intercept run on an unidentified aircraft. As stated, the ROE was specifically designed to slow down a potential engagement to allow time for those in the chain of command to check things out. 

The ACE must interact with the AWACS crew to identify reported unidentified aircraft. 

Controls Controls to enforce the safety constraints included the ROE to provide overall principles for decision-making and to slow down engagements in order to prevent individual error or erratic behavior, the ACE up in the AWACS to augment communication by getting up-to-the-minute information about the state of the TAOR airspace and communicating with the pilots and AWACS crews, and the Mission Director on the ground to provide a chain of command from the pilots to the CFAC commander for real-time decision making. 

The AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control Systems) acts as an air traffic control tower in the sky. The AWACS OPC mission was to ... 

Coordinate air refueling (for the fighter aircraft and the AWACS itself)... 

An AWACS is a modified Boeing 707, with a saucer-shaped radar dome on the top, equipped inside with powerful radars and radio equipment that scan the sky for aircraft. A computer takes raw data from the radar dome, processes it, and ultimately displays tactical information on fourteen color consoles arranged in rows of three throughout the rear of the aircraft. AWACS have the capability to track approximately one thousand enemy aircraft at once while directing one hundred friendly ones [159]. 

The AWACS carries a flight crew (pilot, copilot, navigator, and flight engineer) responsible for safe ground and flight operation of the AWACS aircraft and a mission crew that has overall responsibility for the AWACS command, control, surveillance, communications, and sensor systems. 

The mission crew of approximately nineteen people are under the direction of a mission crew commander (MCC). The MCC has overall responsibility for the AWACS mission and the management, supervision, and training of the mission crew. Tlie mission crew members were divided into three sections ... 

Surveillance The surveillance section is responsible for the detection, tracking, identification, height measurement, display, and recording of surveillance data. As unknown targets appear on the radarscopes, surveillance technicians follow a detailed procedure to identify the tracks. They are responsible for handling unidentified and non-OPC aircraft detected by the AWACS electronic systems. The section is supervised by the air surveillance officer, and the work is carried out by an advanced air surveillance technician and three air surveillance technicians. 

Because those who had designed the control structure recognized the potential for some distance to develop between the training of the AWACS crew members and the continually evolving practice in the no-fly zone (another example of asynchronous evolution of the safety control structure), they had instituted a control by creating staff or instructor personnel permanently stationed in lUrkey. Their job was to help provide continuity for U.S. AWACS crews who rotated through OPC on temporary duty status, usually for thirty-day rotations. This shadow crew flew with each new AWACS crew on their first mission in the TAOR to alert them as to how things were really done in OPC. Their job was to answer any questions the new crew... 

The AWACS typically takes off from Incirlik AFB approximately two hours before the first air refueling and fighter aircraft. Once the AWACS is airborne, the systems of the AWACS are brought on line, and a Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS ) link is established with a Turkish Sector Operations Center (radar site). After the JTTDS Unk is confirmed, the CFAC airborne command element (ACE) initiates the planned launch sequence for the rest of the force. Normally, within a one-hour period, tanker and fighter aircraft take off and proceed to the TAOR in a carefully orchestrated flow. Fighters may not cross the political border into Iraq without AWACS coverage. 

The AWACS mission crew must identify and track all aircraft in the TAOR. Friendly aircraft must not be identified as a threat (hostile). 

The AWACS mission crew must accurately inform fighters about the status of all tracked aircraft when queried. 

The AWACS mission crew must alert aircraft in the TAOR to any coalition aircraft not appearing on the flowsheet (ATO). 

The AWACS crew must not fail to warn fighters about any friendly aircraft the fighters are targeting. 

The Joint Tactical Information Distribution System acts as a central component of the mission command and control system, providing ground commanders with a real-time downlink of the current air picture from AWACS. This information is then integrated with data from other sources to provide commanders with a more complete picture of the situation. 

The ACO (Airspace Control Order) stipulates that fighter aircraft may not cross the political border into Iraq without AWACS coverage and no aircraft may enter the TAOR until fighters with airborne intercept (AI) radars have searched the TAOR for Iraqi aircraft. Once the AI radar-equipped aircraft have sanitized the no-fly zone, they establish an orbit and continue their search for Iraqi aircraft and provide air cover while other aircraft are in the area. When they detect non-OPC aircraft, they are to intercept, identify, and take appropriate action as prescribed by the rules of engagement (ROE) and specified in the ACO. 

Controls Controls included the ACO, the ATO, flowsheets, radios, IFF) the ROE, training, the AWACS, procedures to keep fighters and helicopters from coming into contact (for example, they fly at different altitudes), and special tactical radio frequencies when operating in the TAOR. Flags were displayed prominently on all aircraft in order to identify their origin. 

Figure 5.4, taken from the official Accident Investigation Board Report, shows a timeline of the actions of each of the main actors in the proximate events—the AWACS, the F-15s, and the Black Hawks. It may also be helpful to refer back to figure 5.1, which contains a map of the area showing the relative locations of the important activities. 

After receiving a briefing on the day s mission, the AWACS took off from Incirlik Air Base. When they arrived on station and started to track aircraft, the AWACS surveillance section noticed unidentified radar returns (from the Black Hawks). A friendly general track symbol was assigned to the aircraft and labeled as H,... 

AWACS declares "on Station." Surveillance section begins tracking a/c ... 

AWACS receives Black Flawks radio call. En route controller reinitiates EE01 symbol to resume tracking. Black Flawks call AWACS to report eh route from "Whiskey" to "Lima"... 

ACE replies to F-15s "...negative words." AWACS radar adjusted to low velocity detection settings F-15S check in with ACE ... 

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