Alarms biological agent

For the detection of slow-acting biological agents (which may not produce symptoms for several days), the system response time would depend on the frequency of sampling and analysis. The frequency of sampling and analysis would be determined by factors such as the cost of the assay, the frequency with which critical reagents need to be replaced, the robustness of the detector, and so on. The minimum response time would be determined by the time required to collect a sample, prepare it for analysis, conduct the assay, and report the results. In the event of an alarm from a detector with a significant false-alarm rate, additional time would be required to determine its validity and to decide on an appropriate response. 

In a defensive strategy that is based on the detection of a chemical/biological agent in order to initiate a response, the time required for authorities to respond to an attack has three components the inherent response time of the detection system, the time required to verify the validity of a detector alarm, and the time required to decide on what action to take in response to the alarm. These three elements are discussed in more detail below. 

The time lag between exposure to a biological agent and the appearance of symptoms may serve as both a plus and a minus for terrorists. An incubation period allows terrorists time to attack and escape before an alarm is sounded. Conversely, an extended incubation period may diffuse the impact that the terrorists hope to achieve to bring attention to their causes (Tierno, 2002).2 The routes of exposure to biological agents vary, but may include ... 

Finding 4 Although the rapid detection of a chemical/ biological attack and identification of the agent used are worthwhile objectives, a defensive strategy that depends exclusively on a detection-system alarm before action is taken (i.e., employment of a detect and react strategy) has several serious limitations. 

The National Institute of Justice has put together multivolume compendiums of instrumentation relevant to chemical and biological weapons detection. However, none of these books contains a critical review of the effectiveness of the technologies. One instrument included in the publication is a portable, handheld, ion mobility spectrometry chemical agent monitor with moderate to high selectivity, but only when used in open spaces, far from vapor sources such as smoke, cleaning compounds, and fumes. This would seem to make it useless in the battlefield. Another listed chemical agent monitor has a below 5% false positive rate. With one in 20 false positives, no one could reasonably act upon an alarm. 

Defense/military Detection of chemical, biological, and toxin warfare agents, treaty verification Combined detection and alarm capabilities, ease of use, high specificity and selectivity, portable, real time output... 

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