Aircraft operators/commanders

Aircraft returning from missions have hits by enemy weapons distributed over various parts of the plane (e.g. wings, tail, fuselage etc.). The operational commander must decide... how to reinforce various parts of the aircraft to improve survivability... The operational commander does not know the distribution of hits on an aircraft that did not return. This is the basic difficulty of making a decision. 

The Combined Forces Air Component (CFAC) was tasked with exercising tactical control of all OPC aircraft operating in the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) and operational control over Air Force aircraft. The CFAC commander exercised daily control of the OPC flight mission through a Director of Operations (CFAC/DO), as well as a ground-based Mission Director at the Combined Task Force (CTF) headquarters in Incirlik and an Airborne Command Element (ACE) aboard the AWACS. 

ICAO has also issued guidelines on the coordination between military authorities and air traffic services (ATS) authorities which recognize in limine that coordination between the responsible military authorities and appropriate ATS authorities is essential to the safety of civil aircraft operations whenever activities potentially hazardous to such operations are planned and conducted by any military units.These guidelines go on to state that in the event that a sudden outbreak of armed hostilities or any other factors preclude this normal coordination process, appropriate State and ATS authorities, civil aircraft operators and pilots-in-command of aircraft must assess the situation based on the information available and plan their actions so as not to jeopardize safety. 

Fortunately, for a couple of reasons, the likelihood of a terrorist attack on a nuclear reactor is quite low. Nuclear reactors operate under tight security and incorporate safety systems. In addition, the extensive shielding around reactors would require large amounts of explosives to create a breach. Even if terrorists could transport large amounts of explosives, they would have to breach a security cordon to reach the reactor. Alternatively, they could commandeer a jumbo jet plane to crash into a reactor or a nuclear pond of used cores, but they would have to breach security measures to do so. Computer modeling indicates that the constraction of most reactors would sustain a 300 mph impact from a commercial aircraft, but not aU scientists agree with these findings (1). 

At the top of the control structure, the National Command Authority (the President and Secretary of Defense, who operate through the Joint Chiefs of Staff) provided guidelines for establishing Rules of Engagement (ROE). ROE govern the actions allowed by U.S. military forces to protect themselves and other personnel and property against attack or hostile incursion and specify a strict sequence of procedures to be followed prior to any coalition aircraft firing its weapons. They are... 

The Airborne Command Element (ACE) flies in the AWACS and is the commander s representative in the air, armed with up-to-the-minute situational information to make time-critical decisions. The ACE monitors all air operations and is in direct contact with the Mission Director located in the ground command post. He must also interact with the AWACS crew to identify reported unidentified aircraft. 

The AWACS carries a flight crew (pilot, copilot, navigator, and flight engineer) responsible for safe ground and flight operation of the AWACS aircraft and a mission crew that has overall responsibility for the AWACS command, control, surveillance, communications, and sensor systems. 

The AWACS typically takes off from Incirlik AFB approximately two hours before the first air refueling and fighter aircraft. Once the AWACS is airborne, the systems of the AWACS are brought on line, and a Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS ) link is established with a Turkish Sector Operations Center (radar site). After the JTTDS Unk is confirmed, the CFAC airborne command element (ACE) initiates the planned launch sequence for the rest of the force. Normally, within a one-hour period, tanker and fighter aircraft take off and proceed to the TAOR in a carefully orchestrated flow. Fighters may not cross the political border into Iraq without AWACS coverage. 

He misidentified the helicopters as Iraqi Hinds. There were two basic incorrect decisions involved in this misidentification. The first was identifying the UH-60 (Black Hawk) helicopters as Russian Hinds, and the second was assuming that the Hinds were Iraqi. Both Syria and Ihrkey flew Hinds, and the helicopters could have belonged to one of the US. coalition partners. The Commander of the Operations Support Squadron, whose job was to run the weekly detachment squadron meetings, testified that as long as he had been in OPC, he had reiterated to the squadrons each week that they should be careful about mis-identifying aircraft over the no-fly zone because there were so many nations and so many aircraft in the area and that any time F-15s or anyone else picked up a helicopter on radar, it was probably a U.S., Thrkish, or United Nations helicopter ... 

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