Verification results Language

We note that these algebraic specifications in CafeObj were re-used because they provide a formal model that had already been validated to correctly represent the coimt algorithm. The transformation of the CafeObj models to an object oriented implementation language (like Java) follows well established methods[ll]. The coimt implementation that results from the CafeObj specifications has an important role to play in later verification of the final prototype where rhe count operates on encrypted votes and involves a single decryption of the result. 

FSV supports a rich subset of the language constructs provided by Simulink and STATEFLOW software. Therefore, we use the FSV-Formal Verification tool to process the overall Simulink schematic (system model and contracts) and perform the following Contract-based Analyses 1) safety analysis 2) coverage analysis. The results of the analyses consist in a text report showing if the contract is verified or violated. The evidence of a contract violation is eventually provided by a simulation trace through the generation of an executable Simulink test harness model. 

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