Theory falsification

A quotation from another great man of the 17th century refers to the same problem. Spinoza wrote in 1674 Omnis determinatio est negatio , i.e., each determination comes from a negation. If we take negatio as a description of falsification, we come to the basis of Popper s theory. Only a falsification is a real advance, because only this, but not a verification, is final. 

Origin science cannot be explained using normal traditional scientific theories, since the processes with which it deals cannot be checked by experiment and are thus also not capable of falsification. 

Ernst Mayr, the foremost living interpreter of Darwinian philosophy, is removing the evolutionary idea from the fundamental laws of science and declares it concept driven . He is distancing himself, Darwin and his evolutionary theory from Laplacien determinism and thus makes Darwinism untouchable by Popper s falsification test for hypotheses of science. Darwinism must be recognized as a scheme of plausible explanations, each justified by a prior assertion. Ernst Mayr is correct as concerns the character of the Darwinian model and with that realization the answer has been found as to why a new hypothesis of evolution. 

Replication of the results are at the core of the falsification process of hypotheses or theories (145). However, even the best... 

In its simpler form, the idea of falsification can be derived from the laws of Logic in fact, if Th stands for theory and Ex for experimental result, the modus tollens gives... 

During almost one and half century, the chemistry of metal hydrides demonstrated many interesting and instructive circumstances. We can see both experimental successes (natural and accidental) and unrealized expectations both scientific clear-headings, successful prognoses and theories (models) which proved to be unsound mistakes - conscientious or not both persistent searches of truth (effectuated sometimes by the tests-and-mistakes way) and anti-science in its different manifestations - up to falsifications. Here sensations also can be seen -both true and false. 

Here, positivism is taken to include falsification, where theories should be falsifiable, where the highest number of falsifiable elements that have not yet been contested is preferable [10]. Here, theories are not necessarily true but a choice of the least unproven one to date [11]. 

In the context of the historical development of our knowledge of the structure of the 2-norbornyl cation since Winstein and Trifan s postulate in 1949, this comparison with the 1,2-dimethyl derivative is very important for aspects provided by the theory of scientific discoveries. As discussed in our book on aromatic diazo compounds (Zollinger, 1994, Chap. 9), verifications are never definitive, in science proofs are not possible (the term proof should only be used in mathematics) falsifications, however, can be definitive. It was shown that molecular orbital calculations and their application to experimental data on the IR and NMR spectra for the 2-norbornyl cation are consistent with a symmetrical, nonclassical cationic intermediate, but not with a rapid equilibrium between two classical intermediates. The... 

Obviously, theory does not support the existence of a-TaON. If it existed, it would lie higher in energy by 314 kj/mol when compared with the well-established j6-TaON. In fact, the successful literature search for the original X-ray data of a-TaON eventually supports the theoretical falsification of a-TaON existence [365]. We note that the falsity of this structure has not been spotted in the crystallographic databases for almost four decades, but electronic-structure calculations from first principles easily detect the problem. Independent structural checks, without having to re-do the synthesis, are now possible. Let us move on to another example. 

So in practice, there can be no talk of a precise, unequivocal falsification of any theory. However, says Popper (1979 391), it is not in his interest to deal with the problem of science in such a practical, naturalistic perspective. Popper considered his own theory of falsifiability, and of scientific method in general, as methodological or philosophical, not as empirical and hence not as falsifiable in itself (analogous to the verificationists conundrum that the principle of verification is not itself verifiable) to consider the scientific method as empirical is to adopt a naturalistic perspective (Popper, 1974a 1010). Although it is possible to study science from a purely descriptive perspective, recording all the facts, difficulties and failures. 

This basic methodological problem remains the same even for the most sophisticated falsificationist, because the evaluation of competing theories (strictly universal propositions for both Popper and Lakatos) in the context of a dynamic research program will always require intersubjective agreement on, and acceptance of, some basic statement that reports on some observation, no matter whether the emphasis is placed on falsification, as with Popper, or on corroboration, as with Lakatos. ... 

In one sense, however, Popper specifically rejected the use of ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses, by adopting a strategy used to immunize a theory from falsification. Popper (1979 185-186) illustrated this strategy using a simple syllogism. 

This is one reason why Popper placed so much emphasis on methodology All admissible means to prevent falsification of a theory must be used ( Popper, 1979 378), but this implies that all means that may be used to immunize a theory against falsification must not be used. Popper insisted on the methodological rule for empirical sciences that criteria of refutation have to be laid down beforehand [before the test, that is] it must be agreed which observable situations, if actually observed, mean that the theory is refuted (Popper, 1989 38 the same claim underlies appeals to verification Ayer, 1952). 

Lakatos needs a critical evaluation of theories in his system just as much as Popper, and just like Popper he did not allow ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses that are not independently testable to distort such critical evaluation of competing theories. Both Lakatos and Popper understood hypotheses in the sense of universal propositions and both employed the modus tollens form of argument. Whether the emphasis is on corroboration or falsification, this very distinction cannot be had outside Popper s solution to the logical problem of induction, for it only can provide that very asymmetry, and hence the basis on which to distinguish falsificationism from verificationism. ... 

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