Scientific investigation, philosophy

Rothbart, D., Scherer, 1. 1997. "Kant s Critique of Judgment and the Scientific Investigation of Matter." Hyle An International Journal for the Philosophy of Chemistry, 3 65-80. 

Whenever science operates at the cutting edge of what is known, it invariably runs into philosophical issues about the nature of knowledge and reality. Scientific controversies raise such questions as the relation of theory and experiment, the nature of explanation, and the extent to which science can approximate to the truth. Within particular sciences, special concerns arise about what exists and how it can be known, for example in physics about the nature of space and time, and in psychology about the nature of consciousness. Hence the philosophy of science is an essential part of the scientific investigation of the world. 

Polanyi s scientific work lay most squarely within a physical chemistry that encompassed thermodynamics, X-ray crystallography, the study of reaction rates, and the application of quantum mechanics to the study of molecular forces and transition states. In two particular areas, the investigation of solid-surface adsorption phenomena and X-ray diffraction studies of the properties of solids, Polanyi helped establish new scientific specialities, at the boundaries of physics and chemistry, for studying the solid state. He also turned his research experiences in these fields into a basis for the formulation of a new philosophy of science centered on scientific practice, rather than scientific ideas. [1] It is these themes that I would like to explore, with remarks in my conclusion on Polanyi s influence in solid-state science. 

Boyle, Robert. (1627-1691). A native of Ireland, Boyle devoted his life to experiments in what was then called natural philosophy, i.e., physical science. He was influenced early by Galileo. His interest aroused by a pump that had just been invented, Boyle studied the properties of air, on which he wrote a treatise (1660). Soon thereafter, he stated the famous law that bears his name (see following entry). Boyle s group of scientific enthusiasts was known as the invisible college , and in 1663 it became the Royal Society of London. Boyle was one of the first to apply the principle that Francis Bacon had described as the new method —namely, inductive experimentation as opposed to the deductive method of Aristotle—and this became and has remained the cornerstone of scientific research. Boyle also investigated hydrostatics, desalination of seawater, crystals, electricity, etc. He approached but never quite stated the atomic theory of matter however, he did distinguish between compounds and mixtures and conceived the idea of particles becoming associated to form molecules. 

Andrea Woody received a B.A. in chemistry from Princeton and her Ph.D. from the department of history and philosophy of science at the University of Pittsbingh. She is assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Washington. Her current research concerns pragmatic techniques such as model building and alternative forms of representation that scientific communities develop to make abstract theories tractable, investigating how these techniques are relevant to philosophical accounts of explanation, representation, and rational theory change. Quantum chemistry remains a favorite landscape for exploring these issues. 

Chemistry is a fertile new area in which philosophy of science could investigate further the question of normative and naturalistic approaches or the question of whether or not scientists actually adopt philosophical positions in the manner in which they use and interpret scientific theories. My own feeling is that chemists, in particular, tend to adopt different attitudes, to use Fine s phrase, depending on what level they are operating at. 

This collection of articles aims to study theory choice in the context of some key theoretical developments in the history of chemistry. Perhaps, the most influential account of theory choice in the philosophy of science has been Thomas Kuhn s (1970) account in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [1]. Kuhn himself contributed to reframe the philosophical problem of theory choice in light of the insights we may derive from thorough historical investigation. Just over fifty years since the publication of Kuhn s seminal book, this volume proposes to engage with his philosophical agenda with a renewed historical and historiographical awareness. 

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