Risk assessment examples

Other types of detectors such as mass selective detectors would need to have their own assessment performed. It should be clearly understood that the outcome of the risk assessment example is a personal assessment and is not meant to be definitive in any way. 

The remainder of this section details the potential application of multivariate methods in the selection of endpoints and in the evaluation of exposure and effects of stressors in ecosystems. Particular reference is made to the application of these methods to the current framework for ecological risk assessment. Examples of the use of multivariate methods in detecting effects and in selecting important measurement variables are covered using both field surveys and multispecies toxicity tests. 

Gentry PR, Hack CE, Haber L, Maier A, Clewell HJ, 3rd. An approach for the quantitative consideration of genetic polymorphism data in chemical risk assessment Examples with warfarin and parathion. Toxicol Sci 2002 70 120-... 

Pleil, J. D., Kim, D., Prah, J. D., and Rappaport, S. M. (2007). Exposure reconstruction for reducing uncertainty in risk assessment Example using MTBE biomarkers and a simple pharmacokinetic model. Biomarkers 12, 331-348. 

The performance analysis (Example 4) and risk assessment (Example 5) can then be accomplished within the paradigm based on the relationships and rules estabhshed between the fields used to define each element. 

Based on the overall paradigm and the data collected and processed by the various technologies, the control/mitigation element can be used to derive indications about the need for taking appropriate actions from a performance analysis and/or a risk assessment. Examples of actions can be adjusting the measurement and monitoring of the asset outputting... 

Risk assessment examples described in chap. 2 clearly present which task categories must be solved in the risk assessment of technical system malfunctions and risk management. But risk assessment and risk management are not restricted to industry only. 

SESSION II Risk Theory and Risk Analysis for Landslides. [1] Landslide Risk Management concepts and framework and examples (2.5 h) [2] Deterministic and Probabilistic models for slope stability evaluation (2 h) [3] Introduction to modelling of catastrophic landslide events (2 h) [4] Empirical models for travel distance (1.5 h) [5] Application examples of probabilistic methods and semi quantitative methods for landslide hazard zonation (2h) [6] Landslide Frequency Assessment (1.5 h) [7] Different components of vulnerability to landslides. Prevention and long term management of landslides (3.5 h) [8] Case Studies coal waste dump risk assessment, example from motorway in La Reunion Island, Aknes Rock slope in Norway (2 h) [9] Application of QRA to other geotechnical problems Internal erosion of dams, crater lake hazard (1.5 h) [10] Advanced numerical models initiation of landslides, propagation of sediments/climate change effects (3.5 h). 

Gadd SA, Keeley DM, Balmforth HE (2004) Pitfalls in risk assessment examples from the UK. Saf Sci 42(9) 841-857... 

Chapter 13 details how to conduct a risk evaluation. The necessary models are developed and explained. A risk assessment example of launching a payload into space, describing how to decide which design or operational changes will make the system safe, and which will increase the risk, is given. 

GHS Hazard Category Suggested Criteria for Classification of OELs for Relative Risk Assessment" Examples ... 

Interpreting PSA as any risk assessment using accident probabilities and consequences, government and industry have prepared many examples. These are discussed as Public Risk, Specialized Analyses, and Performance Improvement. 

A risk assessment analyses systems at two levels. The first level defines the functions the system must perform to respond successfully to an accident. The second level identifies the hardware for the systems use. The hardware identification (in the top event statement) describes minimum system operability and system boundaries (interfaces). Experience shows that the interfaces between a frontline system and its support systems are important to the system cs aluaiion and require a formal search to document the interactions. Such is facilitated by a failure modes and effect analysis (FMEA). Table S.4.4-2 is an example of an interaction FMEA for the interlace and support requirements for system operation. 

Although the main emphasis of this chapter will be on qualitative human reliability methods in risk assessment, this section will illustrate the importance of both qualitative and quantitative methods in CPQRA. An example of a typical assessment, described by Ozog (1985) will be considered. The stages of the risk assessment are as follows ... 

From a human reliability perspective, a number of interesting points arise from this example. A simple calculation shows that the frequency of a major release (3.2 x lO"" per year) is dominated by human errors. The major contribution to this frequency is the frequency of a spill during truck unloading (3 X10" per year). An examination of the fault tree for this event shows that this frequency is dominated by event B15 Insufficient volume in tank to imload truck, and B16 Failure of, or ignoring LIA-1. Of these events, B15 could be due to a prior human error, and B16 would be a combination of instrument failure and human error. (Note however, that we are not necessarily assigning the causes of the errors solely to the operator. The role of management influences on error will be discussed later.) Apart from the dominant sequence discussed above, human-caused failures are likely to occur throughout the fault tree. It is usually the case that human error dominates a risk assessment, if it is properly considered in the analysis. This is illustrated in Bellamy et al. (1986) with an example from the analysis of an offshore lifeboat system. 

There is considerable interest in developing a database on human error probabilities for use in chemical process quantitative risk assessment (CPQRA). Nevertheless, there have been very few attempts to develop such a database for the CPI compared, for example, with the nuclear industry. Some of the reasons for this are obvious. The nuclear industry is much more highly integrated than the CPI, with a much greater similarity of plant equipment... 

It is important to remember that unexpected benefits may arise from integration. You should actively look for these benefits and document them. It may be possible to improve some of these benefits by small modifications to the plan or integration framework. Such additional work should be undertaken only with the appropriate approvals. Never the less, if any benefits would only be achieved with the integration project, you should include them in your overall statement of benefits. An example of this might be the better allocation of capital to risk reduction efforts when an integrated risk assessment is done-addressing several different types of risk. 

To estimate tlie potential iiupaet on tlie publie or tlie environment of aeeidents of different types, the likely emergeney zone must be studied. For example, a liazardous gas leak, fire, or explosion may eause a toxie cloud to spread over a great distance. The minimum atmospheric dispersion model. Vtirious models can be used tlie more difficult models produce more realistic results, but tlie simpler and faster models may provide adequate data for planning purposes. A more tliorough discussion of atmospheric dispersion is presented in Part 111 - Healtli Risk Assessment. 

Tlie reader should also note that tlie risk to people can be defined in terms of injury or fatality. The use of injuries as a basis of risk evaluation may be less disturbing tlian tlie use of fatalities. However, tliis introduces problems associated with degree of injury and comparability between different types of injuries. Further complications am arise in a risk assessment when dealing witli multiple hazards. For example, how are second-degree bums, fragment injuries, and injuries due to toxic gas e.xposure combined Even where only one type of effect (e.g., tlueshold to.xic exposure) is being evaluated, different durations of e.xposure can markedly affect tlie severity of injury. 

Tlie following simplified example, constructed by Hendershot, will facilitate tlie transition to tlie case studies. Suppose tliat a risk assessment is being conducted at a chemical plant to detenuine the consequences of two incidents (tlie initiating events of die event tree shown in Fig. 21.1.1) defined as... 

D. Hendershot, "A Simple Example Problem Illustrating tlie Methodology of Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Assessment," paper presented at AICliE Mid-Atlantic Region "Day in Industry" for Chemical Engineering Faculty, Apr. 15, 1988. 

By using risk assessment techniques to determine the exposure of the property, it is possible to determine the appropriate standard of security for a risk. The following simple example will clarify this point. 

Our new appreciation of the role of inflammation in atherosclerosis shows the way for translation of these novel biological insights to clinical practice, for example by aiding the identification of individuals at risk of adverse cardiovascular events [5]. In this context, inflammatory biomarkers such as CRP merit rigorous consideration for inclusion in risk assessment strategies. In addition, these scientific advances provide a framework... 

PBPK models improve the pharmacokinetic extrapolations used in risk assessments that identify the maximal (i.e., the safe) levels for human exposure to chemical substances (Andersen and Krishnan 1994). PBPK models provide a scientifically sound means to predict the target tissue dose of chemicals in humans who are exposed to environmental levels (for example, levels that might occur at hazardous waste sites) based on the results of studies where doses were higher or were administered in different species. Figure 3-4 shows a conceptualized representation of a PBPK model. 

Another issue is the development and refinement of the testing protocols used in mesocosms. Mesocosms could have a more important role in environmental risk assessment if the data coming from them could be better interpreted. The use of biomarker assays to establish toxic effects and, where necessary, relate them to effects produced by chemicals in the field, might be a way forward. The issues raised in this section will be returned to in Chapter 17, after consideration of the individual examples given in Part 2. 

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