Replacement Training

On 7 December 1941, the existing CWS RTC was quite inadequate. The Chemical Warfare School lacked accommodations for enlisted students, although construction nearing completion would eventually enable it to handle up to two hundred officer students. The branch had no officer candidate school and no unit training facilities. Of even more concern to the CWS was the fact that these deficiencies in its training establishment were indicative of the lack of a suitable chemical troop basis. Although this situation was soon to be improved by a renewed concern in the Army over the probability of gas warfare, this development was by no means foreseeable at the end of 1941.  

Soon after the declaration of war the General Staff questioned whether the technical branches were making adequate provision for service units under the augmented protective mobilization plan for 1942. In response to an inquiry on this point, the Chief, CWS, reported that insufficient chemical 

Chemical Composite Service and General Service Companies 0 2 6 10 16 15 19 20 20 20 

On the combat side the picture was gloomy. Only two chemical mortar battalions had been authorized—and they were a considerable distance from activation. Yet it was clear that if an adequate complement of service troops was needed in connection with defense against enemy gas attack, weapons troops in substantial numbers were just as necessary for retaliation. The two went hand in hand in any balanced gas warfare program. 

The strength of the CWS at the end of April 1942 was 1,832 officers and 12,068 enlisted men. Four chemical mortar battalions were in training and by the end of June two more were to be mobilized. The air and ground chemical troop basis as of 25 May 1942 called for 4,970 officers and 47,192 enlisted men. It contemplated the mobilization of 105 ground service units and 103 air chemical units. The Army Supply Program called for the activation of twenty-two more chemical mortar battalions in 1943 and 1944. The sharp increases necessitated an immediate step-up of training activities. 

---

Key technical staff become unavailable for the toll or leave the company. Attempt to interview and extract key information from the persons prior to their departure. Arrange for an overlap period for the key person and their replacement. Train the replacement. Ensure the replacement person is given access to the historical records of the toll contract, technology package, MOC packages, and incident investigations. 

CWS to determine on this location for its new training center/ The Chief of Engineers was accordingly directed in May 1942 to construct the housing facilities for a 5,000-man replacement training center with completion date set for i December 1942/ The new reservation was designated Camp Sibert in honor of the first Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service/ Col. Thomas J. Johnston was made com-manding officer while... 

General Shekerjian, Commanding General, Replacement Training Center, Camp Sibert, Alabama. 

Entry of the United States into World War II as an active belligerent presented an immediate challenge to the system of prewar replacement training. If the preparatory training of all individual soldiers under the training center system were to be continued, considerable increase in the number of centers would be necessary. After careful study, the War Department re-... 

Weekly reports submitted by the replacement training centers advised TAG of enlisted men who would complete the training course one month later. For example, the report from Camp Sibert on 29 June 1943 advised that during the week of July 26-31 following, there would be available for shipment 401 graduates with qualifications as indicated ... 

---