Procedures temporary, identified

TLE without reimplantation Temporary PM, vacuum drainage, and arterial line (if still present) are removed the day after the procedure and the patient is completely mobilized. Chest X-ray is planned to confirm radiological success of the procedure and identify possible occult complications (i.e., pleural effusion, pulmonary embolism, mild pneumothorax). Discharge is feasible after 48 h if infective problems or other complications do not emerge. Sometimes, it is necessary to remove a PM from one side while another pacing system is present contralaterally. In such cases, the temporary PM is usually removed at the end of the procedure and the maintained system is checked before discharge, especially in case of complex procedures, in order to exclude a post extraction malfunction. 

Examples of procedural access controls include inventorying keys, changing access codes regularly, and requiring security passes to pass gates and access sensitive areas. In addition, facilities should establish the means to readily identify all employees, including contractors and temporary workers with unescorted access to facilities. 

Once a critical instrument loop is identified, a procedure for testing the entire loop must be written. The test procedure will influence the design of the new system, since, if possible, the test should be an actual performance test. For example, if a high temperature should close a valve, the ideal test would consist of raising the temperature to see if the value closes. Efforts should be made to avoid test procedures which require temporary wiring disconnects, valve closures, and so on, which might not be returned properly to operating condition. 

All temporary procedures are clearly Identified. A special designation such as T or the word temporary in the title or Purpose section may be used. 

Figure 5-4. Identifying temporary procedures. The use of the word TEMP" in the header and the word temporary" in the Purpose section ciearly indicates that this is a temporary procedure. Its expiration date is defined.

The above comments do not mean that there is no place for general conclusions and deductions, particularly in reviews as distinct from audits. However, such conclusions should be identified as such. In the above example, the auditor might write, There appears to be no policy for writing operating procedures for temporary operations. This conclusion is based on the following observations... ... 

Recalling that the Commission, in its PC-V/12, subparagraph 6.2(a), adopted the understanding that the set of procedures identified as being necessary for the elosure/inactivation of CWPFs in the context of their subsequent destruction or, pending a final decision, their temporary conversion to chemical weapons destruction facilities or possible conversion for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, should apply in aU of the above three cases. 

Several plants have established clear and comprehensive procedures on temporary installations. The operation shift supervisor is normally responsible for the final approval of the installation, and has in the control room an updated status of the temporary installations in the plant. TTie number of temporary installations is low, and they are well identified in the field. Very specific control and instructions are set up during outages, when the number of temporary installations normally increases and ftiere are more contractors in the plant. Several plants have indicators on temporary installations. 

During OSART missions, several plants had a clear plant components identification policy/procedure. In addition, well developed systems for reporting deficiencies in components identification were identified, which included the immediate assignment of an authorized temporary identification (tag). 

Dupont committed to improving the reactor maintenance program at the Savannah River Site (SRS) based on the results of audits performed by the National Academy of Scientists and Engineers (NAS E) and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). In February 1989, Dupont issued an SRS-wide Maintenance Improvement Plan identifying eight key elements that were in need of improvement. One of these elements was the performance of a self-assessment by the Reactor Maintenance Department based on the elements identified in INPO 85-038, Guidelines for the Conduct of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Stations (Reference 1). The self-assessment was to include a review of (1) work control procedures, (2) maintenance requests, (3) supervision of maintenance activities, (4) review of completed maintenance requests, (5) temporary repairs, and (6) control of contractor personnel. This assessment (Reference 2) was completed in January 19.90. The results of the assessment, which were compared against draft DOE Order 5480, established the foundation for the Reactbr Maintenance Improvement Plan (MIP)(Reference 3), which was issued the end of April 1990. 

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