Mental events tokens

I won t pursue these matters here. The reason is that NRP theorists must reject this combination of type role-functionalism and token physicalism, for they deny that mental event tokens are identical with physical event tokens. Mental event tokens, they hold, are exemplifications of functional properties and are not identical with exemplifications of physical properties that realize the functional properties. Let us see how to spell out their idea using Kim s theory of events. The idea is that functional properties will be constitutive properties of events rather than characterizing properties of events. Thus, let T be a functional property and P be one of its physical realizers. An exemplification of T by x at t will be the event [x, F, t] the property of which the event is an exemplification will be functional property F. If property T is realized on the occasion in question by P, then X will have Fat t in virtue of having Pat t. It follows that x, P, t] occurs and has role R, and indeed x, P, t will realize x, F, t by virtue of [x, P, t] having R But although [x, P, t R, it is nevertheless the case that x, P, t + x, F, t]. The reason is that P F. Thus, if there are functional properties and they are constitutive properties of events, then exemplifications of functional properties are not identical with exemplifications of their physical realizers. 

Also as concerns a mental event token and its narrow realizer (what we earlier called its core physical realizer ), he says If an Mi token is realized by a Pj-token, then the Pj-token just is part of the Mi-token (Melnyk, 2003, p. 137). He says nothing in defense of these claims. In fact, it is not the case that if an Mj token is realized by a Pj-token, then the Pj-token just is part of the Mj-token (p. 137). And it is not the case that the narrow realizer of a C-type event is surely a part or constituent of that C-type event (p. 160). The relation that the narrower physical realizer bears to the functional event — namely, the realization relation — is not a part-whole relation. It is, rather, the relation of role-occupancy. Narrow or core realizers are not parts or constituents of functional events. 

So on this view, although mental properties are distinct from and irreducible to physical properties, every mental event is token identical with some physical event. Thus, for example, the mental event of my being in pain might be token identical with the physical event of enhanced substance P production. So there would be, for instance, a single event E, which causes my behavior of sa)dng ouch . This event E has both physical properties (higher concentrations of substance P) and mental properties (painfulness). These mental properties supervene on the physical properties, but yet are irreducible to the physical. 

Now how does all of this pose a problem for nonreductive materialism Nonreductive materialism holds that although every mental property supervenes on some physical property (and is possibly also realized by tiiat physical property and token identical with it as event), mental properties are neither type identical with nor reducible to physicjd properties. Now in order to give an adequate account of mental causation, the nonreductive materialist will need to be able to say how it is that mental events can be causally potent - i.e., how can a mental event M cause another mental event M to occur, and how can a mental event M cause a physical event P to occur Now if we are working with a Davidsonian model and we have token identity, where every mental event is token identical with its physical instantiation base, then there is no problem with event causation. Mental events are causal because theyjust are physical events. But the... 

Notice that this is the same type of move that saves event causation for anomalous monism. Mental events are causal because each token mental event is identical with a physical event. The problem of property causation, however, is a challenge posed by the exclusion principle that the nonreductive... 

The above considerations show that as long as we hold M and P to be token identical events, Kim s plausible version of the exclusion principle will not rule out mental events as causal. This is good reason for the nonreductive materialist to hold a Davidsonian view of event identity. It seems that a mere supervenience or realization relation between M and P is not quite enough. In addition to supervenience and realization, it seems that we also need the token event identity of M and P, in order to avoid M getting ruled out as causal by the plausible exclusion principle. Thus, fijom this point forward, I will assume that any viable nonreductivist position requires that M and P are token identical events. I will, from now on, assume a Davidsonian event identity. 3.3 Kim s second formulation of the exclusion principle Kim s second formulation of the exclusion principle, which actually appears in the exclusion argument is as follows ... 

We see later, however, that a property exemplification account of events even when combined with the denial of type physicalism can nevertheless be compatible with token physicalism, the thesis that every mental event is a physical event. 

The basic idea offiller-functionalism (for mental events) is that a mental event type Af is the event type, whatever it is, such that tokens of it would occupy a certain role R, which includes a causal roled The causal role will consist of conditional roles both as a cause and as an effect it will consist of the role of being such that its tokens would have certain kinds of effects in certain conditions and would be effects of certain kinds of events in certain conditions. On this view, an event will realize Af in virtue of being the event type tokens of which would occupy or fill role R. 

Now, if physical event type P is the event type tokens of which would occupy R, then P is Af it is Af in virtue of filling R, for being Af just is filling that role. On the assumption that it is contingent that tokens of P would occupy R, the type identity statement will be a contingent statement of identity since the description the event type, whatever it is, tokens of which occupy R is a nonrigid designator. This brand of filler-functionalism is compatible with type physicalism — the view that every mental event type is identical with a physical event type. Indeed, it entails type physicalism when combined with the thesis that whenever a mental... 

It might be thought, however, that the filler-functionalist notion of realization is of no use to anyone concerned with the place of the mental in nature. Notice that if there is more than one event type tokens of which would occupy R, then there is no event type that is the event type tokens of which would occupy R. And if so, then, on the filler-functionalist view just presented, there would be no mental event type M. There would be only a vacuous concept of an Af event, a concept to which no event type, no property, answers, for the concept has a singular descriptive content, and that content would fail to be satisfied if there is no property that is the unique occupant of the role. 

Let us turn, then, to the role-functionalist implementation of the notion of realization. NRP theorists typically appeal to it, and so are typically role-functionalists. According to type role-functionalism, a mental event type M is a second-order event type it is the event type of undergoing an event of some type or other tokens of which would play a certain role R, which includes a causal role. ° (The account of R is as before.) If an event type is such that tokens of it would play R, then it is a realizer of M. If there is more than one event type tokens of which would play R, then Af is multiply realizable. Type role-functionalists can maintain, without commitment to type physicalism, that whenever a mental event type is realized, it is realized by some physical event type or other. On this role-functionalist view, the... 

Thus, even on a property exemplification conception of events, type role-functionalism can be combined with token physicalism (for events). Type role-functionalism, you will recall, is the view that a mental event type M is the event type of undergoing an event of some type or other tokens of which would play a certain role R. It is open to a type role-functionalist to maintain that every instance of an Af type event is a physical event. The property of being an M type event (an event tokens of which would play R) would be a characterizing property of an event rather than a constitutive property. A physical event (an event with a constitutive physical property) would be an instance of M in virtue of the fact that it plays role R. This combination of type role-functionalism and token physicalism is compatible with mental events being causes even given physical closure and the physical effects principle, for it entails that every mental event is a physical event. 

At the very least, M and P must be related by supervenience. However, it may be that mere supervenience is not enough to give us an adequate accoimt of mental causation within a physicalist framework. We might want to hold a view like Davidson s, where not only does M supervene on P, but P realizes M, and M and P are properties of a single event. So as properties, M and P are distinct, but as event, M and P are token identical. Whether physicalism requires mere supervenience, a picture like Davidson s with realization and event identity, a functional reduction of M to P as Kim advocates, or a fullblown type identity of M and P will be discussed shortly. 

This version of the exclusion principle seems quite plausible, with not much argument needed to convince us of its truth. It seems right to say that two distinct events cannot both be causes of e, if one of the events is a sufficient cause of e (and it is not a case of overdetermination). But notice that Kim here speaks in terms of events rather than properties. It is not clear why Kim does this here, since on a Davidsonian model of nonreductive materialism, the mental and physical events would be token identical and would not be two distinct events. What we would have is a single event with distinct mental and physical properties. 

Thus, if we use this version of the exclusion principle in Kim s exclusion argument, we will not get Kim s desired conclusion. This version of the exclusion principle says that two distinct events cannot both cause P. But as long as we hold the event identity of M and P, then as event, M and P are token identical. M and P are only distinct as properties. Since this version of the exclusion principle only requires us to rule out distinct events as both being causal, but not distinct properties, this version will not force us to rule out either M or P as a cause of P. Thus, this version of the exclusion principle, while independently plausible, will not get Kim to his desired conclusion (8) -i.e. that mental property M gets excluded by physical property P as the cause of P. ... 

---