Mental causation exclusion argument

This type of objection to nonreductive materialism is central to the work of Jaegwon Kim. Kim discusses this objection extensively in the various versions of his exclusion argument or supervenience argument. He holds that the only way to give mental properties a causal role is to functionally reduce them to physical properties, since physical causation will always rule out causation in virtue of irreducible mental... 

This chapter has asked whether the anomalism of mental properties rules out causation in virtue of these mental properties. Although this chapter has focused upon Davidson s view in particular, this problem is relevant to all nonreductive materialist views, since all nonreductive materialist views hold that mental properties are anomalous. If all cases of causation are backed by strict causal laws, then it might seem that mental properties can never be causal, since anomalous mental properties will never be part of these strict laws. I have argued however that even if all causation is backed by strict laws, mental properties can still be causal, since strict laws do not rule out causation in virtue of higher-level properties that are not part of those laws. I have raised two possible objections to this last claim, which are discussed in great detail in the next three chapters. Let us now turn to the first of these objections - Jaegwon Kim s exclusion argument. 

If these are the only kinds of cases that can be called cases of causal overdetermination, then Kim is right that it is absurd to think that all cases of mental causation are cases of overdetermination. If we use the term overdetermination as Kim seems to here, then we should reject the idea that P is causally overdetermined by M and P. Surely M and P are not completely independent and individually sufficient causes for P. Rather, M and P are related by supervenience (and possibly also by realization and event identity as well). It is not as if M could have caused P even if P had not occurred. If P had not occurred, M would not have occurred either - M depends on P for its existence. Thus, it seems plausible to accept premise (7) in Kim s exclusion argument - i.e. that P is not causally overdetermined by M and P. 

Since these are the crucial issues in the debate, my argument against ftmctional reduction and for nonreductive materialism is two-fold. First I argue against the exclusion argument. If I am successful, then what I have done is left nonreductive materialism as a viable option. The purpose of the exclusion argument is to show that nonreductive materialism cannot account for mental causation because it cannot make irreducible mental properties causal. If the exclusion argument worked, then we would... 

This leaves us with epiphenomenalism (which we don t want) and nonreductive materialism as viable options. If my arguments against exclusion and for context dependence are successful, then what I ve done in my first four chapters is show that nonreductive materialism gives us the most promise at being able to aeeount for mental causation. 

Let me begin with a close reading of Kim s most recent formulation of the exclusion argument, with an eye toward seeing just how Kim thinks he has defused the generalization bomb. Chapter 2 of Mind in a Physical World, The Many Problems of Mental Causation, introduces the exclusion problem with the admonition that it strikes at the very heart of physicalism (p. 30). It arises, he says, for anyone who accepts two modest metaphysical commitments the thesis that the mental supervenes on the physical, and the thesis that the mental is realized in the physical. Denial of either of these theses is tantamount, in Kim s opinion, to the rejection of physicalism. 

At this point it may be useful to remind ourselves what is at stake in the exclusion argument. Various considerations (functionalism, multiple realization, externalism, explanatory gap) make M P persuasive. Also, there are scientifically compelling reasons to accept physicalism and Closure. Giving up mental causation is a last resort. So, Kim s argument is a paradox. Each o] M P, Closure, Mental Causation, and Exclusion is plausible, but together they are inconsistent. We proponents of NRP accept M P, Closure, and Mental Causation, so we have to reject Exclusion. 

Kim s criticisms of nonreductive materialism attempt to show, primarily through the use of his exclusion or supervenience argument, that irreducible mental properties carmot be causal properties. I argue, against this, that the reductionist picture of causation created by the exclusion principle is deeply mistaken, and I offer an accoxmt of how irreducible mental properties can be causal properties. 

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